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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Over the past few years, brazen and horrific acts of violence by drug trafficking 
organizations have proliferated enormously throughout Mexico. According to 
conservative estimates, there were 11,244 nationwide homicides in Mexico attributed to 
drug trafficking organizations in 2010.1 These extraordinary numbers of executions by 
drug trafficking organizations in Mexico are both staggering and deeply concerning. 
Compared to statistics from other countries, the current annual death rate from drug 
trafficking violence in Mexico far exceeds the total number of casualties in both 
Afghanistan and Iraq during 2008.2 The number of annual drug related homicides in 
Mexico is also more than nine times greater than the average number of deaths during 
civil war, which is approximately 1,000 fatalities per year.3  
 Clearly, these figures indicate that the current violence attributed to drug 
trafficking in Mexico is not insignificant. In fact, hyper-violence by drug trafficking 
organizations only appears to be growing rapidly within the country. While there were 
only 1,776 drug related killings in Mexico in 2005, the number of murders by drug 
traffickers more than quadrupled by 2009.4 Additionally, while there were fairly low 
levels of violence among Mexican drug cartels in the past, according to Mexican 
authorities there have been more than 28,000 deaths related to drug trafficking 
organizations since President Felipe Calderón took office in 2006.5 This out of control 
                                                 
1
 Justice in Mexico Project, December 2010 News Report (San Diego: Trans-Border Institute, 2010), 1. 
2
 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “The Violent Drug Market in Mexico and Lessons from Colombia,” Foreign 
Policy at Brookings 12 (March, 2009): 1. 
3
 Ibid., 1. 
4
 David A. Shirk, Drug Violence in Mexico: Data Analysis from 2001-2009 (San Diego: Trans-Border 
Institute, 2010), 4. 
5Angelica Duran-Martinez, Gayle Hazard, and Viridiana Rios, 2010 Mid-year Report on Drug Violence in 
Mexico (San Diego: Trans-Border Institute, 2010), 2.  
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escalation in violence over the last few years is only matched by the increased savagery 
of drug cartel violence. Sadistic executions, such as decapitations, castrations, burning 
alive, torture, and burning victims in acid have become commonplace among Mexican 
drug trafficking organizations.6 While these nefarious acts of violence were previously 
concentrated among drug traffickers, in recent years high profile law enforcement 
officers, journalists, and elected officials have become regular victims of drug-related 
executions.7 Drug violence in Mexico has even reached such worrisome extremes that 
innocent civilians within Mexico are increasingly affected. These disturbing levels of 
violence clearly demonstrate that drug trafficking organizations are a serious problem for 
Mexico at the present time. 
 The rapid growth and aggressiveness in Mexican drug cartel violence is 
significant not only because of the threat it poses to the Mexican society, but also because 
it has emerged at the same time as tremendous changes are occurring in the Mexican 
political system. In 2000, Vicente Fox was elected as the president of Mexico. This 
election was a watershed moment in Mexico’s political history because it initiated the 
transition from authoritarian rule to democracy in Mexico. Vicente Fox’s election as the 
first president from an opposition party ended the reign of the Institutional Revolutionary 
Party (PRI), which had consistently held power in Mexico since the late 1920’s. During 
its 71-year rule, the PRI regime was characterized by semi-authoritarian and 
undemocratic practices. Indeed, the PRI’s one-party hegemonic regime in Mexico was 
highly centralized, devoid of ideology, employed the co-option of opponents, and utilized 
                                                 
6
 George W. Grayson, Mexico: Narco-violence and a Failed State (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction 
Publishers, 2010), 4. 
7
 Stephanie Hanson, Mexico's Drug War (Washington D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, 2008), 1. 
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undemocratic strategies to ensure its political dominance. The dedazo – the Mexican 
president’s selection of his presidential successor – was possibly the most visible 
authoritarian practice of the PRI. This practice ensured that the PRI, rather than election 
primaries, selected the successive political leadership and it maintained a system of 
loyalty to the PRI party, rather than the Mexican constituency. However, the 2000 
elections changed this undemocratic system. Vicente Fox’s election demonstrated that the 
political system that had been dominated by a single party had evolved into a competitive 
electoral system with the participation of multiple political parties. Thus, this moment 
was the culmination of Mexico’s transition away from the PRI’s semi-authoritarian 
system and towards a democracy. 
 While Mexico clearly underwent a transition to an electoral democracy in 2000, 
there still need to be great strides in order for Mexico to fully become a consolidated 
democracy. This is because a democracy is not just based on free and fair elections. A 
political system is only democratic when democratic institutions, rules, and practices 
have become “the only game in town”.8 Or, in other words, a political regime is truly a 
consolidated democracy when the probability of democratic breakdown is very low.9 
While the transition to an electoral model was the first step in meeting these 
requirements, Mexico is still in the process of consolidating democratic patterns of 
behavior. Even though the political system is no longer a PRI regime, many of the PRI’s 
semi-authoritarian practices and culture remain. Therefore, over the past decade Mexico 
                                                 
8
 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, “Toward Consolidated Democracies,” Journal of Democracy 7, 2 (1996): 
14. 
9
 Steve Barracca, “Democratic Consolidation and Deepening in Mexico: A Conceptual and Empirical 
Analysis,” paper prepared for delivery at the 2003 meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, 
March 27-29, 2003, 3. 
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has been undergoing a process of adopting democratic practices and institutions so that 
the country’s political system will become a functional, substantive democracy. 
However, a stable democracy is still a far reach from Mexico’s current political system. 
Although Mexico is currently consolidating its democracy, the future of democracy in 
Mexico still remains uncertain. Whether the situation in Mexico continues on its 
democratization path, disintegrates into chaos and violence, or reverts back to 
authoritarianism is still up in the air.  
 It is for this reason that the impact of drug trafficking organizations has great 
significance for democracy in Mexico. In recent years, drug trafficking organizations 
have generated significant levels of violence and crime throughout Mexico. Expansion of 
drug trafficking organizations and related violence is threatening to disrupt and 
destabilize key aspects of Mexican society. Thus, through a unique set of historical 
circumstances, Mexico is currently confronted with an increasingly powerful and violent 
organized crime syndicate, at the same time that it is simultaneously attempting to adopt 
more democratic principles and political structures. The intersection of the rising drug 
trade and the process of democratic consolidation in Mexico is incredibly significant to 
the future of Mexico’s nascent democracy. This is because, if Mexico is unable to control 
the devastating impact of drug trafficking organizations, Mexican governance will 
degenerate into chaos and lawlessness. However, if heavy-handed authoritarian measures 
are employed in order to control drug trafficking organizations, the Mexican political 
system will likely revert to authoritarianism. Thus, drug trafficking organizations and 
counter-drug efforts put Mexico’s fledging democracy in a precarious situation. Under 
these circumstances, how drug cartels and efforts to combat these organizations affect 
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Mexico will greatly determine the direction of the country’s political system. Indeed, the 
influence of drug trafficking organizations and counter-drug efforts – the two sides of the 
drug war – will ultimately determine the path and shape of Mexico’s democracy. 
Therefore, a central question this paper seeks to address is: what is the impact of the drug 
war on the consolidation of democracy in Mexico? Can Mexico sustain its fledgling 
democracy while drug trafficking organizations and counter-drug efforts are present in 
Mexico? 
 In order to assess the consequences of the drug war on the consolidation of 
democracy, I will focus on the military, the justice system, and the press as important 
indicators of democratization in Mexico. While there are clearly many other factors that 
are important to Mexico’s democratization, civilian control over the military, the 
effectiveness of the judicial system, and the strength of the media – the so-called “fourth 
estate of democracy” – are three central pillars of democracy that will be examined in the 
following chapters. Only if civil-military relations, the judicial system, and the press are 
upheld, can Mexico have a strong substantive democracy. These factors indicate, 
however, that Mexico cannot consolidate democracy while the drug war is sustained. 
Indeed, it appears that drug trafficking organizations and counter-drug policy weaken 
civil-military relations, the judiciary, and the press. Since these institutions are essential 
for democracy, it is evident that the drug war undermines the consolidation of democracy 
in Mexico. 
 This paper will begin tracing the influence of the drug war on democratic 
consolidation by examining the history of drug trafficking organizations in Mexico. It 
will then describe the current counter-drug policies employed in Mexico and their 
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origins. The next section will analyze the ways that counter-drug policy can contribute to 
worsened civil-military relations, thereby undermining democratization in Mexico. The 
third section of this paper will examine the impacts of the current drug trafficking 
situation on the strength of the judicial system. The ramifications of drug policy and drug 
trafficking organizations on the Mexican press will then be evaluated. Finally, the overall 
effect of the drug war on democratization will be assessed and conclusions will be drawn 
about the future of democracy in Mexico.  
 
History of Drug Trafficking in Mexico 
 In order to fully understand the drug war and its impacts on Mexico, one must 
begin with an understanding of Mexico’s history with drug trafficking organizations. In 
fact, Mexico’s current situation with drug trafficking organizations can largely be 
explained by its historical development. During the 19th century and the beginning of the 
20th century, Mexico was only a low level supplier of drugs to the United States, and 
consumption of narcotics within Mexico itself was moderate.10 However, by the Mexican 
Revolution in the early 20th century, Mexico’s relationship between the state and drug 
trafficking began to take form. Beginning in 1909, the United States initiated the control 
and prohibition of drugs within the States.11 At the same time that the United States was 
outlawing drugs, Mexico was deeply engulfed in revolution. During the Mexican 
Revolution (1910-1929), revolutionary leaders were more concerned with maintaining 
                                                 
10
 Luis Astorga and David A. Shirk, “Drug Trafficking Organizations and Counter-drug Strategies in the 
U.S.-Mexican Context,” in the forthcoming book Shared Responsibility: U.S.-Mexico Policy Options for 
Confronting Organized Crime, Eric L. Olson, David A. Shirk, and Andrew Selee, eds., (Washington 
D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2010), 4. 
11
 Luis Astorga, “Mexico: Drugs and Politics,” in The Political Economy of the Drug Industry: Latin 
America and the International System, Menno Vellinga, ed. (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 
2004), 86. 
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their political careers and political stability than they were interested in drug control. 
Therefore, since drugs were outlawed in the U.S., but there was essentially no regulation 
of illicit substances in Mexico because of the revolution, these ideal conditions gave rise 
to drug trafficking from Mexico to the United States.  
 The majority of early drug trafficking in Mexico was concentrated in Baja 
California, which was governed by Colonel Esteban Cantú from 1916-1920.12 Cantú was 
one of the first revolutionary leaders who used his political power to run an opium 
trafficking business so that he could buy arms, pay his troops, and fund his government 
expenses.13 However, from this point on, the trend expanded throughout Mexico and the 
drug trade was increasingly treated as a business opportunity that, depending on their 
ethical leans, politicians would take part in. This de-facto relationship, where the political 
power cooperated with drug trafficking organizations, was further institutionalized within 
Mexico when the state party was established in 1929. The state party, which later became 
the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), was the dominant centralized leadership 
throughout Mexico for the majority of the 20th century. During the party’s 71-year rule 
over Mexico, the PRI notoriously developed a strategy of making implicit and explicit 
arrangements with its antagonists in order to maintain order and stability. This system 
was particularly applicable to the PRI government’s relationship with drug trafficking 
organizations. Indeed, the PRI created a centralized power structure that permitted and 
protected drug trafficking organizations throughout Mexico.14 Essentially, political 
officials from the PRI had a special coalition with drug traffickers that allowed them to 
                                                 
12
 Ibid., 86. 
13
 Ibid., 86. 
14
 George W. Grayson, Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State? (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction 
Publishers, 2010), 2. 
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operate in relative harmony without a threat from the political authority in exchange for 
political stability or a portion of drug profits. A telling example of the pact between 
political authorities and drug traffickers was the situation in Coahuila during the mid-20th 
century. The governor of Coahuila during this time, Nazario Ortiz Garza, was a close 
friend of Antonio Wong Yin, one of Mexico’s most prominent opium traffickers. Many 
other illicit traffickers were also known to have close relations with General Jesús García 
Gutiérrez, the chief of military operations in Coahuila.15  
 These types of government-drug cartel relations were not uncommon. The 
coordination between politicians and drug trafficking organizations was a pattern that 
characterized the PRI government’s approach towards the drug trade for most of the 20th 
century. Indeed, many scholars define the history of drug trafficking under PRI 
leadership as a political-criminal coalition that was maintained by a centralized 
authoritarian party whose police organizations essentially regulated drug trafficking.16 
This de-facto relationship between the government and drug trafficking organizations 
was only further emphasized in 1947, when the establishment of the Federal Security 
Directorate (DFS) founded a structural connection between the state and drug 
traffickers.17 Specifically, the DFS was a government institution that maintained control 
                                                 
15
 Astorga, “Mexico: Drugs and Politics”, 87. 
16
 Luis Astorga provides the most detailed account of the historical relationship between DTOs and the 
state. See: Luis Alejandro Astorga Almanza,  “Traficantes de drogas, politicos y policias en el siglo XX 
mexicano,” in Vicios publicos, virtudes privadas: La corrupcion en Mexico, Claudio Lomnitz ed. 
(Mexico City: CIESAS, 2000); Luis Astorga, El siglo de las drogas: el narcotráfico, del Porfiriato al 
nuevo milenio (Mexico City: Plaza y Janís, 2005); Astorga, “Mexico: Drugs and Politics”, and Astorga 
and Shirk, “Drug Trafficking Organizations and Counter-drug Strategies in the U.S.-Mexican Context”. 
Also see: George W. Grayson, Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State? (New Brunswick, N.J.: 
Transaction Publishers, 2010); Carlos Antonio Flores Pérez, "Organized Crime and Official Corruption 
in Mexico," in Police and Public Security in Mexico, Robert A. Donnelly and David A. Shirk, eds. (San 
Diego: Trans-Border Institute, 2009); Louise Shelley, “Corruption and Organized Crime in Mexico in the 
Post PRI-Transition,” Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 17, 1 (August 2001): 213-231. 
17
 Astorga, “Mexico: Drugs and Politics”, 88. 
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over illicit drug traffickers and assured protection to these drug organizations in exchange 
for a portion of their profits.  
 Not only was the special collaboration between the state and drug trafficking 
organizations in Mexico distinctive and significant, it also had substantial consequences 
for the nation. Since drug trafficking in Mexico developed as a business controlled, 
tolerated, and regulated by prominent politicians, drug trafficking violence was extremely 
limited and it was primarily constrained to drug cartels.18 Because the PRI had a 
monopoly on drug trafficking organizations through these arrangements, it could also 
determine the territories (known as “plazas”) controlled by drug trafficking organizations, 
when to use force against these illicit organizations, and the ability to grant impunity to 
specific traffickers. As a result, Mexico had a cohesive network of drug trafficking 
organizations that worked in relative harmony for decades because it was a market that 
grew within the official party system of the country.  
 Nevertheless, even though drug trafficking has existed in Mexico since the 19th 
century, the most noticeable and significant change in Mexican drug trafficking took 
place in the 1980s. During this decade there were a few pivotal changes that completely 
altered the institutional arrangement between the government and drug trafficking 
organizations. Most significantly, the turning point in the structural connection between 
the government authority and drug cartels came in 1985 when U.S. DEA agent Enrique 
Camarena was murdered by Mexican DFS police and drug traffickers.19 Allegedly, many 
high-ranking defense and interior ministry officials were involved in the decision to kill 
                                                 
18
 Hanson, 3. 
19
 Astorga, “Mexico: Drugs and Politics”, 91. 
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Camarena.20 This event effectively exposed the corrupt government-drug trafficking 
coalition, inciting immense pressure for reform from the United States. As a result, the 
DFS was dismantled, and the protection and containment from the government that drug 
traffickers had enjoyed for more than five decades was officially terminated.  
 This completely changed the composition of the drug trade in Mexico. Organized 
crime networks that previously enjoyed a carte blanche in Mexico now had to fight for 
their territories of control and work to maintain their access to the profitable U.S. drug 
market. Thus, these alterations have increasingly led to turf wars and competition among 
drug cartels in Mexico. Many scholars argue, in fact, that since the power of drug 
trafficking organizations was previously centralized under the PRI, this corrupt system 
may have actually led to the relatively limited violence of drug traffickers in the early 
decades.21 Currently, however, more violent, fragmented, and unpredictable patterns are 
emerging among drug trafficking organizations in Mexico than have ever existed in the 
country. Since the late 1980s, the cohesive network of drug traffickers in Mexico has 
been replaced by more diverse, highly competitive, and hyper-violent drug cartels.  
 However, it is important to note that the 1980s were also a critical juncture for 
drug trafficking organizations and their relationship with the Mexican state because of 
transformations in the international drug market. During the mid 1980s, drug trafficking 
shifted to over-land routes in Mexico because of considerable counter-drug efforts in 
Colombia and the dismantling of Florida drug trafficking routes from the Caribbean and 
                                                 
20
 Astorga and Shirk, “Drug Trafficking Organizations and Counter-drug Strategies in the U.S.-Mexican 
Context,” 5. 
21
 Duran-Martinez, 11. And Maureen Meyer, Coletta Youngers, and Dave Bewley-Taylor, AT A 
CROSSROADS: Drug Trafficking, Violence and the Mexican State (Washington D.C.: Washington 
Office on Latin America, 2007), 3. 
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Colombia.22 Therefore, while Mexico had previously been a supplier of only heroin and 
marijuana, at this time the country also emerged as a transit point for cocaine from other 
South American nations because of the redirection of drug flows.23 These changes in the 
drug industry are significant because, as a result, Mexican drug trafficking organizations 
began serving a greater and more profitable role in drug trafficking to the United States. 
As Maureen Meyer explains, this change in the mid-1980s was a formative shift in 
Mexico because small-scale drug traffickers suddenly expanded into sophisticated drug 
trafficking organizations with unprecedented levels of power and an increased ability to 
corrupt government officials.24 In addition to the expansion of drug trafficking 
organizations (DTOs) within Mexico and the dissolution of the DTO-government pact, 
this time period also coincided with internal destabilization of Mexican drug trafficking 
organizations. In the latter half of the decade, many drug traffickers defected from their 
original organizations to form smaller, more fragmented drug trafficking organizations, 
such as the disintegration of the Guadalajara DTO into the Juárez, Sinaloa, and Tijuana 
DTOs at the end of the 1980s.25 These changes contributed significantly to the avaricious, 
fragmented, and aggressive drug trafficking organizations that exist in Mexico today.  
 Thus, the elements introduced into Mexican drug trafficking organizations during 
the mid-1980s should not be overlooked. Indeed, ever since this pivotal moment in 
history, criminal organizations involved in drug trafficking in Mexico have only gained 
momentum. While there have many fluid changes in drug trafficking organizations 
                                                 
22
 Ted Galen Carpenter, Bad Neighbor Policy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 169. 
23
 Jorge Chabat, “Mexico’s War on Drugs: No Margin for Maneuver,” Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 582 (Jul. 2002): 136. 
24
 Meyer, 2-3. 
25
 John Bailey, “Drug-Traffickers as Political Actors in Mexico’s Nascent Democracy,” Working paper, 
Georgetown University, August 2010, 11. 
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throughout the 20th century, the mid-1980s were the tipping point that led to Mexico’s 
current ominous drug trafficking dilemma. Indeed, ever since this critical juncture, drug 
cartels have amassed enough power and political might to overwhelm many Mexican law 
enforcement and political institutions. Not only that, there has only been increased 
fighting among drug trafficking organizations for control of Mexico’s drug trade, with 
unprecedented levels of violence developing since the late 1980s. A telling example of 
the increasing magnitude of drug trafficking and drug-related violence are recent 
homicide statistics from Mexico. For example, in 2005 there were approximately 1,500 
people killed in drug related violence in Mexico, while in 2006, 2,500 individuals were 
victims to drug violence.26 Subsequently, in 2010 there were more than 11,244 deaths 
related to drug trafficking violence; a 76% increase in violence from 2009.27 Clearly, the 
pattern of greater violence, scope, and power among drug trafficking organizations within 
Mexico has only increased in the last few years. 
 
Current Counter-drug Policies in Mexico 
 In addition to the historical context of drug trafficking within Mexico, the current 
drug trafficking situation and its impact on the democratization process cannot be 
understood without an awareness of current counter-drug strategies employed within the 
country. Mexico’s recent counter-drug efforts, however, are fairly complex. Nevertheless, 
the origins of current day drug policies in Mexico can be traced back to 1987 when De la 
Madrid was the first Mexican president to declare drug trafficking a national security 
                                                 
26
 Meyer, Youngers, and Bewley-Taylor, AT A CROSSROADS: Drug Trafficking, Violence and the 
Mexican State, 1. 
27
 Justice in Mexico Project, December 2010 News Report, 1-2. 
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issue, which expanded drug control efforts significantly more than previous 
administrations.28 In addition to expanded drug policy under De la Madrid, his 
administration also ushered in an era of military involvement in counter-drug efforts. In 
1992, the Instituto Nacional para el Combate a las Drogas (INCD) was established and it 
included representatives from the armed forces, making it the first time that the army was 
included in counter-drug policy.29 Following the lead of their predecessors, both the 
Zedillo administration (1994-2000) and the Fox administration (2000-2006) promised to 
restore public security threatened by drug trafficking organizations and increased 
participation of the military in counter-drug operations.30 
 Subsequently, when Felipe Calderón took office in 2006, one of his first actions 
as president was to deploy thousands of soldiers and federal police to suppress drug-
related violence in states severely affected by organized crime. In the nine states where 
troops were deployed, federal security forces were mandated with eradicating illicit 
crops, gathering intelligence, interrogating suspects, conducting raids, and confiscating 
contraband. 31 These initial actions at the beginning of Calderón’s presidential term are 
emblematic of Mexico’s current policy towards organized crime and drugs. The main 
focus of Calderón’s approach towards drug trafficking has been the deployment of 
federal police and military troops to reestablish security in regions seriously affected by 
criminality and violence from drug trafficking organizations.32 Heavy reliance on the 
military is the main component of Mexico’s current counter-DTO strategy because, in 
                                                 
28
 María Celia Toro, Mexico’s “War” on Drugs: Causes and Consequences (Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1995), 30. 
29
 Meyer, 5. 
30
 Ibid, 5. 
31
 Hanson, 1. 
32
 Juan Carlos Garzón, Mafia & Co.: The Criminal Networks in Mexico, Brazil, and Colombia (Washington 
D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2008), 9. 
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large part, the current police, intelligence, and justice systems within the country are too 
weak and corrupt to effectively enforce public order and security. Therefore, the goal of 
this military intensive approach under Calderón is to use the military to directly combat 
and dismantle drug trafficking organizations so that the government has time to establish 
an array of institutional reforms.33 Ultimately, the hope is that, while the armed forces 
combat specific drug trafficking organizations and dismantle their leadership, Mexico 
will be able to implement extended reforms and investment in improving the country’s 
police-justice-regulatory system.  
 As of now, however, this strategy has only been partially implemented. Between 
December 2006 and July 2009, there have been more than 43,000 members of the federal 
police and military deployed to ten different regions of Mexico.34 While military 
deployment under the Calderón administration has achieved significant tactical victories 
in its mission against illicit drug trafficking organizations, these have only been short-
term achievements because new drug trafficking organizations easily replace expelled 
traffickers and new law enforcement forces are easily corrupted.35 Unfortunately, 
however, the institutional reforms in Calderón’s counter-drug policy are limited and they 
will likely take years, if not decades, to be effectively implemented. Thus, current drug 
trafficking policy appears to have successfully implemented short-term military solutions, 
but it still lacks long-term solutions of police and judicial reform needed to effectively 
combat organized crime in Mexico. 
                                                 
33
 Bailey, “Drug-Traffickers as Political Actors in Mexico’s Nascent Democracy,” 4. 
34
 Ibid., 10. 
35
 Meyer, 2. 
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 In order to fully understand Mexico’s drug policy, the country’s war on drugs also 
must be analyzed in relation to the United States. Mexico and the U.S. are two countries 
that are closely intertwined, particularly in respect to drug trafficking. In large part, 
Mexican policies towards counter-drug trafficking are tied to policies that are promoted 
and funded by the United States. The Mérida Initiative, a 1.6 billion dollar program 
funded by the United States to support law enforcement activities targeted against drug 
trafficking organizations in Mexico and Central America, is a telling example of the 
preeminent role of the U.S. in Mexico’s current drug policy. Established in 2007, the 
Mérida Initiative provides funds for law enforcement training, improved intelligence, 
crime prevention programs, and equipment used to combat organized crime involved in 
drug trafficking in Mexico.36 The establishment of the Mérida Initiative was a formative 
moment in counter-drug trafficking efforts because not only did it represent an 
unprecedented level of collaboration between the U.S. and Mexico towards the drug war, 
it also hugely increased the scale and scope of Mexican drug control efforts. Without a 
doubt, the immense amount of financial and technical support provided under the Mérida 
Initiative has enabled greatly expanded counter-drug trafficking efforts in Mexico. 
 While the United States has clearly provided financial support for Mexico’s drug 
policy, it seems that the U.S. government is following Mexico’s lead in respect to the 
formulation of policies towards combating drug trafficking organizations. John Bailey 
explains that while the U.S. predominantly developed counter-drug policies in countries 
such as Colombia, Mexican counter-drug strategy has recently been based on 
                                                 
36
 United States Government Accountability Office, Mérida Initiative: The United States Has Provided 
Counternarcotics and Anticrime Support but Needs Better Performance Measures. Washington D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 2010, 1-4. 
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collaboration between Mexico and the United States.37 This is significant because it 
demonstrates that even though the United States promotes certain approaches for 
combating drug trafficking organizations, ultimately the current government of Mexico 
controls and creates the strategies that are being implemented throughout the nation. 
Nevertheless, it appears that the United States has been extremely influential in 
promoting the military’s role in counter-drug policy. According to Maureen Meyer, the 
United States has encouraged involvement of the armed forces in Mexico’s counter-DTO 
efforts because the military is believed to be less corrupt than the police, and the military 
is regarded as the only institution with adequate capacity to combat drug trafficking 
organizations.38 Since this approach is similar to the Calderón administration’s current 
drug policy, it is difficult to discern the exact extent of the U.S.’s influence on shaping 
Mexico’s drug strategies. But regardless of who has greater influence over current policy, 
one thing is clear: the financial support and political power of the United States plays a 
fundamental role in counter-drug trafficking efforts throughout Mexico and its presence 
cannot be ignored. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
37
 John Bailey, “Drug-Traffickers as Political Actors in Mexico’s Nascent Democracy,” 4. 
38
 Meyer, 3. 
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THE MILITARY AND COUNTER-DRUG POLICY: IMPLICATIONS FOR 
DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION 
 The interaction between the military and the political system is one of the central 
issues faced by consolidating democracies in Latin America. The relationship between 
the armed forces and civilian government demands significant attention because it plays a 
major role in the democratization process and it can even determine the survival of a 
consolidating democratic regime. This is because a true democracy cannot be maintained 
without civilian control over the armed forces.39 Only when the civilian government 
makes or sanctions all actions of the state, including the dealings of the armed forces, can 
the state truly promote the interests and rights of its citizens. However, when the armed 
forces are involved with or intervene in the political process, the government cannot 
effectively exercise its democratic functions.  
 Fortunately, in the case of Mexico, the country’s historical experience has been 
characterized by military subordination to civilian control and it has largely avoided the 
negative ramifications of poor civil-military relations, such as military coups. In fact, the 
civil-military relationship in Mexico is somewhat of an anomaly in the Latin American 
region because there has been longstanding military subordination to the civilian political 
authority under the PRI’s leadership.  Roderic Camp and Jordi Díez attribute this 
relationship to a myriad of factors including Mexico’s atypical past history under the PRI, 
the degree of interpenetration between the Mexican military and civilian leadership, and 
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the Mexican military’s view of civil-military relations.40 Both scholars also describe this 
relationship as a “pact” between the military and the PRI, where the PRI exchanged 
institutional autonomy for civilian control over the armed forces and abstention from 
military intervention in politics.41 Given that this harmonious and stable civil-military 
relationship was established and normalized under PRI rule, the political transition that 
Mexico has undergone in the last decade is particularly relevant to the country’s current 
civil-military relations. With the election of Vicente Fox in 2000 and the subsequent 
process of democratic consolidation, the traditional PRI framework has been profoundly 
disrupted in Mexico. The past structures in the political system that enabled civilian 
control of the military, such as the PRI “pact” with the armed forces, the historical 
integration of the military into the PRI political regime, and a system of clientelism 
between these interest groups, no longer exist in Mexico’s current consolidating 
democracy.  
 With the elimination of the PRI framework that channeled and controlled military 
demands to the civilian government, the relationship between the armed forces and the 
political authority is changing. Indeed, the armed forces in Mexico are redefining their 
roles and are reestablishing their institutional identity in response to the transforming 
political system.42 The redefinition of civil-military relations currently occurring in 
Mexico is incredibly important because it could lead to fundamental changes in the 
military’s traditional subordination to civilian political authorities. Thus, as the new 
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political system in Mexico establishes new norms and structures, the military is at a 
critical juncture. Whether the military maintains the tradition of civilian supremacy over 
the armed forces and how the officer corps reconstructs civil-military relations will play a 
significant role in determining Mexico’s future, especially with regards to the 
consolidation of democracy within the country. 
 In light of Mexico’s democratization process and the precarious state of civil-
military relations, the military’s role in counter-drug missions in Mexico is extremely 
important. As mentioned previously, the military is becoming increasingly involved in 
the government’s counter-drug mission. While the role of the armed forces in counter-
drug strategies was limited solely to crop eradication before the 1980s, the military now 
has greatly expanded responsibilities in combating drug trafficking.43 As Marcos 
Moloeznik bluntly explained, the current war on drugs in Mexico is almost exclusively 
based upon the armed forces.44 The increasing involvement of the armed forces in 
counter-drug policy is particularly apparent in the increased number of military troops 
dedicated to counter-drug trafficking efforts in recent years. For example, under 
Calderón’s administration, the number of military personnel participating in counter-drug 
efforts increased 133% from Vicente Fox.45 Funding and training towards military 
counter-drug operations have also expanded significantly, based in large part upon the 1.6 
billion dollar Mérida Initiative. Initiated in 2007, the Mérida Initiative not only provides 
one of the highest levels of military assistance ever provided to the Mexican armed 
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forces, it also is the largest U.S. counter-narcotics aid package in the world after 
Afghanistan and Colombia.46 
 These recent increases in the military’s role in counter-drug trafficking are no 
accident. There is general agreement that the military – perceived to be the best authority 
to combat drug trafficking organizations because of its immunity to corruption, 
professionalism, organizational capacity, and resources – should be highly involved in 
counter-drug efforts. However, even though there is approval for the armed forces’ role 
in combating drug trafficking organizations, military participation in drug operations is 
undertaken at some risk.  Given the vulnerability of civil-military relations and the 
unstable political consolidation process in Mexico, there can be unintended consequences 
from the military’s expanded involvement in these untraditional missions. Therefore, a 
central question that comes to the forefront is: what implication does the decision to use 
the military to combat drug trafficking have on the consolidation of democratic 
governance in Mexico? Is military participation in counter-drug efforts an obstacle to the 
democratization process? 
 It appears that military involvement in drug policy has significant potential to 
undermine the consolidation of democracy in Mexico. This consequence is particularly 
evident through the way that counter-drug missions affect the relationship between the 
military and the state. Civil-military relations theory and recent developments in Mexico 
all indicate that military involvement in counter-drug efforts challenges democratization 
because of decreased civilian control over the military and weakened responsiveness of 
the armed forces to democratic political authority. 
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Relevant Scholarly Theories on Civil-Military Relations  
  Existing scholarly work on civil-military relations provides valuable insight into 
the effects of drug-related military doctrines on Mexico’s consolidating democracy. Most 
noticeably, there is widespread consensus among scholars that military involvement in 
drug policy has the propensity to weaken civilian control of the military in Mexico.47 The 
fact that scholars agree that counter-narcotics missions expand the military’s role in 
politics is significant because this outcome weakens Mexico’s nascent democracy. This is 
a significant challenge to democratization because increased military autonomy and 
political influence limits the state’s responsiveness to the people and the development of 
democratic procedures. Military involvement in politics also weakens civilian institutions 
that are crucial for the consolidation of democracy. While there is general consensus on 
the negative impact of drug efforts on civil-military relations, how these missions can 
alter the military’s posture towards Mexico’s democratizing government remains 
somewhat ambiguous. Nonetheless, there are a few civil-military relations theories that 
demonstrate how the Mexican military’s current role in the drug war has the potential to 
affect this relationship. 
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 Most notably, existing analyses of militarization and its impact on military 
expansion into politics provide a clear explanation of the hazards of expanded counter-
narcotics military missions in Mexico. A leading civil-military relations expert aptly 
describes militarization as “a process in which increasing state resources are allocated to 
the armed forces and/or military related activities”.48 As the Mexican government shifts 
its resources from political and police institutions to the military in order to fight the drug 
war, there is clearly increased militarization occurring in Mexico as a result of this 
mission. In fact, concern over the trend of militarization in Mexico as a result of the 
armed forces’ role in drug policy is common.49 Increased militarization in Mexico is 
problematic for democratization because it increases the likelihood of military influence 
in politics. Augusto Varas explained this potential outcome best when he stated that an 
overemphasis on the importance of the armed forces in Latin American countries leads to 
“growing military involvement in, and control of, domestic politics”.50 Thus, the 
increased dependence on the military that currently exists in Mexico because of the 
military’s central role in counter drug efforts clearly weakens democratic civilian 
governance. Focusing scarce resources on military missions instead of on the economic, 
social, and political causes of the drug trafficking problem is also a grave miscalculation 
for Mexico’s consolidating democracy. This is because increased militarization diverts 
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funds and energy from political and institutional reforms that would develop democracy 
within the country, and even help to address the drug trafficking issue in the long-term. 
Therefore, not only does militarization of the drug war divert attention from reforms that 
would enhance democracy, it also creates greater civil-military tensions and increases the 
influence of the military institution in the political realm. 
 The military’s involvement in drug policy is also significant because of its 
internal security focus. Focusing military efforts on the internal security threat of drug 
trafficking instead of external threats is problematic for the military’s relationship with 
the democratizing government in Mexico. Scholars have warned that internal security 
missions for the armed forces – such as counter-drug strategies – lead to the expansion of 
military prerogatives and military encroachment on civilian political affairs.51 This is 
because defending internal security is a broad and ambiguous mission that gives the 
Mexican military substantial freedom. Since the objective of the military is essentially a 
blank slate, the armed forces enjoy greater military prerogatives. In the case of Mexico, 
the ambiguous purpose of establishing security in regions affected by drug trafficking 
essentially gives the military free reign to carry out their missions as they see fit. This 
increased institutional autonomy for the armed forces is particularly problematic because 
it easily makes the military unaccountable to the Mexican people. Counter-narcotics 
strategies also affect military involvement in politics because it gives the military the 
sense that it is the guarantor of the nation against drug trafficking organizations. When 
the military perceives itself as the national arbiter, this rationale justifies non-
constitutional and undemocratic intervention in order to establish security in a time of 
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crisis.52 This not only legitimizes military intervention in civilian politics, it also gives the 
military superiority over civilian control and establishes a politicized role of the armed 
forces in Mexican society. Therefore, the emphasis on military involvement in the arena 
of public safety against drug trafficking in Mexico will likely induce greater military 
control of the government’s political affairs. 
 Even though the internal security focus of counter-drug trafficking efforts poses a 
risk to civil-military relations, the consequences of this type of military doctrine may not 
be as extreme in Mexico. Throughout the last nine decades of the Mexican military’s 
history, the officer corps has been dedicated to internal missions within the country.53 
Therefore, the military’s role in counter drug trafficking efforts is not a significant 
diversion from the domestic missions that have characterized the Mexican military for 
nearly a century. Indeed, the fact that the military’s institutional history of domestic 
security missions coincides with the tradition of civilian control over the armed forces in 
Mexico indicates that the internal security focus of drug policy will not substantially alter 
the military’s role within the country. Since the Mexican government has continually 
maintained its hegemony over the military while the officer corps carried out domestic 
missions, one may initially assume that the domestic focus of counter-drug trafficking 
will not induce military encroachment on the political arena. However, because increased 
counter-narcotics missions for the armed forces have coincided with recent regime 
change and political transformation in Mexico, the reality within the country may be 
different than history might predict. 
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  As mentioned previously, democratic political transformation has placed the 
armed forces at an important crossroads. The shift in political power in 2000 has 
destabilized the civil-military relationship in Mexico and existing traditions of military 
subordination to the civilian government are unlikely to continue in the same manner. 
The process of democratization also increases the likelihood of this outcome because 
democratic institutions and practices are currently feeble and unstable in Mexico. In 
countries like Mexico with high levels of political instability and weak institutions, the 
effects of internal security missions on military engagement in politics are greater. This is 
because political conditions, such as weak civilian government or ineffectual institutions, 
predispose countries to military rule. 54 Especially when the organizational resources, 
effectiveness, and coherence of the military varies greatly from the capacity of civilian 
government institutions, increased military prerogatives and political influence are more 
likely.55 When the Mexican military is given a greater role in domestic counter-drug 
efforts, this imbalance between the armed forces and the unstable civilian government in 
Mexico is exacerbated. In consolidating governments, the probability of military 
intervention is also determined by military officers’ perception of whether the civilian 
government is capable of resolving the nation’s problems better than the armed forces. 
Since counter-drug efforts and public security in Mexico almost exclusively depend on 
the military, the armed forces will have greater confidence in their ability to lead and 
fulfill the duties of the state, which makes a military coup a likely phenomenon. 
Therefore, using the military for internal security doctrines such as the drug war is 
                                                 
54
 Constantine Danopoulos, “Intervention and Withdrawal,” in From Military to Civilian Rule, ed. 
Constantine Danopoulos, (London: Routledge, 1992), 3. 
55
 Samuel Fitch, The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1998), 36-37. 
  
29 
 
troubling, especially for a country that is precariously transitioning from authoritarianism 
to a consolidated democracy. Indeed, civilian control over the armed forces in Mexico 
will probably worsen as a result of the military’s role in counter-drug policy, even though 
these domestic security roles have been common in Mexico’s past. 
 While many other aspects of civil-military scholarship are also applicable to the 
role of the armed forces in counter drug missions in Mexico, these are some of the main 
theories that address this issue. From a theoretical standpoint, the previous sections 
demonstrate that the military’s accelerating participation in the Mexican drug war clearly 
undermines the future of consolidation of democracy within the nation. This is directly 
due to the fact that military involvement in the drug war increases the likelihood of 
military expansion into the political arena, or even a military coop. This prospect for 
Mexico’s consolidating democracy is not limited to theoretical speculation. Many 
changes and tendencies have been recently observed in the Mexican armed forces that 
demonstrate the erosion of democracy rather than the consolidation of democracy within 
Mexico. 
 
Recent Experiences and Changes within the Military as a Result of Counter-drug 
Missions 
 The most evident indication of the degeneration of democratic consolidation in 
Mexico as a result of military counter-drug missions is the appointment of active-duty 
military personnel to civilian government leadership positions. Ever since the role of the 
military was expanded into greater counter-narcotics tasks nearly a decade ago, there has 
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been increased staffing of civilian government posts by military officers.56 Indeed, since 
the election of Vicente Fox in 2000, the number of active-duty military commanders 
holding civilian leadership positions has nearly doubled from 4,504 military officers to 
8,274 in 2008.57 Incorporating the military into head government positions, such as the 
appointment of General Arturo Chávez as the current Attorney General of Mexico, is 
concerning because it increases the military’s influence over politics and it limits 
responsiveness to the Mexican people. By decreasing democratic accountability and 
oversight, these military appointments clearly counteract democratizing elements in 
Mexico’s political structure. Therefore, the correlation between the military’s increased 
involvement in the drug war and the presence of military officials in government reveals 
the corrosive nature of the military’s role in counter-drug policy for democratic 
consolidation. 
 The appointment of military personnel to civilian government is not the only 
indicator of the effects of counter-drug policy on the democratization process in Mexico. 
Public perception and attitudes also have a significant impact on the consolidating 
democracy of Mexico. In his critical assessment of democratic states, Juan Linz describes 
political legitimacy as “the belief that in spite of shortcomings and failures, the existing 
political institutions are better than any others that might be established”.58 This 
evaluation of legitimate democratic institutions unmistakably reveals the importance of 
public opinion. The extent to which citizens are satisfied with the performance of 
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Mexico’s democratizing state will determine the likelihood that they will support a new 
or undemocratic political regime.  
 Currently in Mexico, the primary issue that occupies public opinion is the level of 
public insecurity from drug violence. According to the Pew Global Attitudes Project, 
crime is the main concern of the Mexican public, with 81 percent of Mexicans 
responding in 2009 that it is a very big problem.59 The role of illegal drugs follows close 
behind, with 73 percent of Mexicans viewing it as a significant problem in their country, 
up from 65 percent in 2007.60 Similarly, in a Global Views survey in 2004, drug 
trafficking was the top concern in Mexico, with 89 percent of Mexicans agreeing that 
drug trafficking is a critical threat to Mexican interests.61 This shows that public 
insecurity, especially from drug trafficking, is a main factor in the public’s view of their 
democratizing government. Since the military currently has the primary role in 
guaranteeing public security and combating drug trafficking organizations, the armed 
forces hold an important influence on public opinion in Mexico. Interestingly, the 
military’s role in counter-drug efforts may both reinforce and weaken democratic 
consolidation within the country through public perception.  
 One reason for this contradictory outcome is the public’s attitude towards the 
armed forces. The Mexican military is one of the most trusted institutions in Mexico. A 
2009 public opinion survey plainly demonstrates this attitude, with 74 percent of 
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respondents in Mexico affirming that they have significant confidence in the army.62 This 
was one of the highest levels of trust expressed towards a Mexican institution; the 
military scored only slightly below the church and schools. Since counter-drug policy has 
increased the military’s activities and visibility throughout the country, the strong amount 
of faith that the Mexican public has for the military may actually improve the public’s 
perception of the current regime. Indeed, there may be greater legitimacy for Mexico’s 
consolidating democracy because the armed forces – an institution that is strongly trusted 
by most Mexicans – has a prominent role in the government’s policies. Especially when 
74 percent of the Mexicans trust the army, while only 29 percent trust the police, the 
military’s involvement in drug policy plays a noticeable role in generating legitimacy for 
the current political system.63 By shifting responsibility for counter-drug trafficking 
efforts from the police to the military, the nation’s most pressing problem was no longer 
in the hands of an institution that was barely trusted or respected by its citizens. Instead, 
counter-drug strategies are predominantly addressed by the military, which increases 
public approval for counter-drug policy because of the public’s faith in the armed forces. 
As a consequence of this policy change, there will likely be increased legitimacy in the 
eyes of the Mexican people for the democratizing regime because it gave a highly trusted 
institution responsibility for combating drug trafficking, a primary concern for this 
population. 
 Conversely, however, there are also signs that public opinion towards the military 
will actually subvert democratic consolidation in Mexico. Respect for the armed forces is 
so high that the Mexican public may actually prefer military control to the current 
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democratic system. In 2009, an average of 64 percent of people in Mexico agreed with 
the statement “when there is a lot of crime, a military take-over would be justified”.64 
This high level of support for an authoritarian overthrow of democracy by the military is 
both astounding and concerning. Indeed, it was one of the highest levels of public support 
for a military coup in exchange for public security in Latin America.65 The Mexican 
public’s willingness to support authoritarian actions by the military is concerning for 
democratic consolidation because it shows that the Mexican public is not greatly invested 
in democracy in their country. Since citizens are open to sacrificing democracy in 
exchange for security, it is clear that the current political regime in Mexico has not 
generated significant confidence in the Mexican people in its capacity to ensure the basic 
needs of its citizens. It also reveals that security overrides democratic consolidation in 
Mexico as a priority in the public perspective.  This public attitude is also important 
because it can influence the actions of the military. If the military perceives public 
discontent with the government’s inability to combat organized crime, the armed forces 
can use this as a justification for intervention in politics. Since a military coup is one of 
most undemocratic measures that can be employed in Mexico, an authoritarian overthrow 
by the armed forces would sever the prospect of the consolidation of democratic 
governance within the Mexican nation. Therefore, if the current government fails to 
establish satisfactory security within the country, it will be unlikely that a democratic 
political system, rather than a military regime, will result. 
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 Corruption within the armed forces is another consequence of the military’s role 
in counter-narcotics missions that undermines Mexico’s consolidating democracy. Given 
the high levels of drug trafficking-related corruption in the police and other federal 
forces, the military’s prominent role in drug policy was promoted because of the 
perceived incapacity for corruption within the armed forces.66 The loyalty of the military 
to the nation and troops’ disciplined obedience to a higher chain of command led people 
to believe that the armed forces are immune to corruption. Ironically, however, increased 
involvement in counter-drug efforts has led to greater corruption of the military by drug 
trafficking organizations.67 The charge against General Gutierrez Rebollo, the 
Commissioner of the Attorney General’s National Institute to Combat Drugs, for being 
paid off by drug traffickers is just one example of the increasing infiltration of corruption 
in the armed forces as a result of its involvement in drug policy.68 Moreover, continued 
participation of the armed forces in counter-drug efforts will only open the door to 
increased military expansion into crime.69  
 Collaboration and corruption between drug trafficking organizations and military 
officials is problematic for a few reasons. Above all, the corrupting influence of drug 
trafficking organizations undermines democracy because the system of plata o plomo 
makes the military accountable to drug trafficking organizations, not the government or 
the Mexican people. Indeed, corruption of the armed forces could lead to a narco-state 
where the military protects and enforces the interests of drug trafficking organizations 
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instead of the welfare of the Mexican citizenry. The expansion of corruption in the armed 
forces is also concerning because it undercuts the rule of law in Mexico, which is a 
fundamental condition for democratic consolidation.70 Without respect for the rule of 
law, democratic procedures and norms cannot be developed within the country. 
Additionally, according to Samuel Fitch’s conception of civilian democratic control of 
the military, the armed forces must be subordinate to the rule of law in order to maintain 
civilian control of the armed forces.71 This is because corruption of the armed forces 
generates a political sphere that is not controlled by the democratic political system. 
Decreased civilian control of the military will weaken Mexican democratization. 
Corruption is also concerning because it damages the public perception of the armed 
forces and drug policy. If the Mexican public loses its faith in the military’s ability to 
carry out drug efforts or if they believe that the military is not adequately protecting the 
public’s interests, legitimacy for Mexico’s democratizing political regime will be greatly 
damaged. 
 In addition to corruption, human rights abuses by military officers during drug 
missions have also been a major concern for the future of Mexico’s democratic political 
system. The threat to human rights was explained well by Vicente Fox’s defense 
secretary, who actually opposed involvement of the military in the drug war because: 
“drug work would inevitably discredit the armed forces, and feared that the soldiers 
would become abusive after months of being stationed in impoverished areas and subject 
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to elevated stress and boredom”.72 His worry over human rights abuses by members of 
the military was well founded. Indeed, there have been an increasing number of human 
rights violations associated with the military’s participation in counter-drug efforts. The 
number human rights complaints against the military at the National Human Rights 
Commission (CNDH) have dramatically increased from 182 in 2006 to 1,230 accusations 
in 2008.73 Human rights organizations have also documented the use of arbitrary 
detention, disappearances, torture, rape, and extrajudicial killings of Mexican citizens by 
the military during counter-narcotics efforts throughout the nation.74 A noticeable 
instance of military abuse was the arbitrary detention of 36 citizens in Michoacán during 
an ambush in search of drug traffickers in May of 2007. Military officers illegally held 
these innocent civilians for up to 84 hours, torturing their captives and even raping four 
underage girls.75 
 These abuses by the military during counter-narcotics and security operations are 
worrisome not only because of their sheer brutality, but also because of the larger 
implications they have for Mexico’s political system. Human rights violations by the 
military during drug missions discredits the current government of Mexico and its 
policies. Indeed, abuses against the Mexican citizenry by a state institution will likely 
lead to a crisis of confidence in the current political establishment or even regime de-
legitimization. Additionally, many citizens and civil society groups have begun to believe 
that the Mexican military is not fit to carry out drug efforts because of troops’ propensity 
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to commit human rights abuses.76 Skepticism towards the military’s participation in drug 
operations can worsen the Mexican public’s perception of a democratic government’s 
ability to effectively fight the drug war. Nevertheless, it is important to note that while 
the public’s view of the armed forces has been damaged by human rights violations, the 
public still prefers the military to lead counter-narcotics operations over the police. As a 
matter of fact, 83 percent of Mexicans support using the Mexican army to fight drug 
traffickers, with only 12 percent opposing their involvement in these missions.77 
Continued support for the military’s role in drug operations in spite of evident human 
rights abuses is probably due to a lack of public confidence in the Mexican police. Thus, 
it is unlikely that the public will advocate for removal of the armed forces from drug 
trafficking missions, even though human rights violations have decreased their 
confidence in the integrity of this counter-drug trafficking approach. 
 Human rights violations by members of the military during counter-drug efforts 
also subvert the consolidation of democracy in Mexico in a more unmistakable manner. 
By acting outside of the law and abusing the country’s citizens, the Mexican military is 
not respecting democratic practices or procedures. Only when state institutions comply 
with democratic norms can democracy be consolidated. Unfortunately for Mexico’s 
democratization, human rights violations during counter-drug missions demonstrate that 
respect for democratic procedures and the rule of law is significantly decreasing within 
the armed forces. Not only that, many human rights allegations against military personnel 
are never investigated or prosecuted in the military’s justice system. Impunity for the 
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armed forces is so extensive that only 37 cases of military abuse in the last ten years have 
resulted in a sentence.78 Failure to prosecute human rights violations by military officials 
makes the armed forces unaccountable for its actions. Thus, human rights abuses by the 
officer corps demonstrate the military’s lack of accountability to the government in 
Mexico’s consolidating democracy. Ultimately, lack of democratic accountability 
undermines the legitimacy of Mexico’s democratic political system, therefore 
diminishing the likelihood of its survival. 
 Lastly, national sovereignty is another relevant aspect of the military’s role in 
counter-drug efforts. Through counter-drug policy, the United States has increasingly 
influenced the Mexican armed forces. By providing funding, equipment, and training to 
the Mexican military for drug operations through the Mérida Initiative, the U.S. has 
significantly shaped the military’s approach to combating drug trafficking organizations. 
This is, in large part, due to the fact that military aid from the United States acts as a 
carrot for the Mexican armed forces to follow the United States’ will. Indeed, some 
observers have noticed that highly visible counter-drug operations, rather than lower 
profile programs, have been implemented by the military in an effort to seek approval 
from the United States.79 Experts have also noticed increased integration, openness, and 
collaboration between the United States and Mexican militaries as the Mexican military’s 
participation in counter-drug trafficking efforts intensified.80 The unprecedented 
integration and influence the United States has over the Mexican military is not 
inconsequential. Indeed, the U.S.’s power over the Mexican military’s role in counter-
                                                 
78
 Camp, “Armed Forces and Drugs: Public Perceptions and Institutional Challenges,” 28. 
79
 Shelley, 224. 
80
 Ibid, 21. 
  
39 
 
drug policy may have important impacts on democratic consolidation in Mexico, with 
potentially unpredictable outcomes. On one hand, increased integration between the two 
countries’ militaries will expose the Mexican military to American democratic norms and 
the U.S. civilian-led structure of government. Exposure to this system will reinforce 
democratization in Mexico because it will strengthen the value of democratic and civilian 
controlled government in the eyes of the armed forces. On the other hand, however, the 
unprecedented amount of U.S. influence over military operations in Mexico will 
undermine progress towards consolidated democracy because it weakens Mexico’s 
national sovereignty. The degree of national sovereignty in Mexico is important because 
it determines the government’s ability to mediate between its citizenry and external 
actors. If the military favors an international actor over the Mexican public for its 
counter-drug policies, the government’s democratic commitment to its citizens is greatly 
damaged. Additionally, the level to which Mexican citizens view their government’s 
policies to be determined by a foreign power will limit their commitment and 
participation in such a system. Since the United States’ influence over the military’s 
counter drug efforts is highly visible, it is likely that the Mexican public will begin to lose 
confidence in their government’s accountability to its citizens. Therefore, the 
consequences of the United States’ influence on the military’s counter-drug trafficking 
operations are two-fold: they can simultaneously reinforce as well as undermine 
democratizing processes in Mexico. Currently, however, it remains unclear which aspects 
of foreign influence on the armed forces will have a greater impact on Mexico’s current 
political system. 
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 Staffing civilian government posts with active-duty military officials, public 
approval for military coups, corruption, human rights abuses, and decreased national 
sovereignty are important consequences of increased involvement of the armed forces in 
drug policy. To one degree or another, all of these results demonstrate a clear decrease in 
democratic tendencies in Mexico. Indeed, these recent developments regarding the armed 
forces and its relationship with the state show us that military involvement in drug efforts 
has undermined democratic accountability and decreased civilian control over the 
military. As a result, current experiences with the Mexican military imply that 
democratization of the Mexican political system and military involvement in counter-
drug policy cannot coexist. Unless there are significant changes to this approach towards 
drug trafficking, it appears that the democratization process will be subverted by the 
armed forces. 
 
Prospects for Democratization 
 Civil-military relations theory and current experiences with the military in Mexico 
all demonstrate that military involvement in counter-drug efforts creates significant 
threats to democratization in Mexico.  The previous sections revealed that military-based 
counter-narcotics policy has the formidable potential to undermine civilian control over 
the armed forces, weaken democratic institutions, and subvert democratic practices in 
Mexico.  Given the substantial ways in which military involvement in drug policy can be 
hazardous to democratization in Mexico, the current political establishment should favor 
another approach to drug trafficking if it wants to uphold Mexico’s fledging democracy. 
Using the Mexican police and judicial system would be a more desirable approach than 
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the military because these civilian institutions do not pose as many risks to democratic 
governance in Mexico. While there are drawbacks to any approach toward drug 
trafficking crime and violence, utilizing Mexico’s police-justice-regulatory system to 
combat organized crime is clearly preferable to the armed forces for Mexico’s democratic 
development. Nevertheless, using the military in the short-term for combating drug 
trafficking organizations and establishing public security currently appears to be a 
“necessary evil” for Mexico. Presently, Mexico’s police-judicial-regulatory apparatus is 
incapable of adequately addressing the DTO threat. Therefore, the military will clearly 
continue to play a central role in Mexico’s war on drugs for some time to come. While 
we cannot predict the extent to which this military-based policy will impact Mexico’s 
nascent democracy, all indications suggest that democratic consolidation in Mexico will 
be seriously undermined by the military’s continued role in counter-drug efforts. 
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THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM: LIKELIHOOD OF DEMOCRATIC REFORM IN 
THE FACE OF CHALLENGES FROM THE DRUG WAR 
 In addition to the role of the military, the judicial system is also a main pillar of 
democratic consolidation for the emerging political system in Mexico. The judiciary is 
important in Mexico because effective rule of law is a requirement for democratic 
governance. Indeed, according to experts on the subject, democratic governability implies 
that the rule of law is protected and enforced by state authorities according to established 
rules.81 However, if a democratic government cannot administer justice throughout a 
nation’s territory, the democratic state is in crisis.82 The judiciary is also important for 
democracy because it can play a significant role in balancing the power of other branches 
of government so that the interests of its citizens are promoted, especially if the executive 
seeks to take dictatorial measures. Not only does a democratic government need an 
effective judiciary in order to function, enforcement of the law is also a necessary 
condition for the continued consolidation of democracy in developing countries. Alfred 
Stepan and Juan Linz state in their seminal work, Toward Consolidated Democracies, 
that the rights of citizens must be protected by the rule of law to allow the consolidation 
of democracy.83 Moreover, there is evidence that the government’s ability to achieve rule 
of law in a country recently undergoing democratic transition determines the legitimacy 
of a democratic regime. It has been demonstrated that there is a strong correlation 
between positive perceptions of judicial system performance and support for democracy 
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in Latin American countries.84 Therefore, the Mexican judicial system’s ability to 
effectively enforce the law is one of the central challenges that Mexican democracy faces 
today, as well as one of the determining factors in the potential for Mexico’s democracy 
to progress in the future. 
 Since the judicial system is clearly an important component of democracy, 
evaluation of its stability and strength is a valuable way to assess the progress of 
democratization of Mexico’s political system. Currently, however, the justice system 
reflects a dismal status of democracy within Mexico. This is because the Mexican judicial 
system has largely failed to apply the rule of law within the country. Indeed, the judiciary 
is such a weak and fragile institution that widespread impunity has abounded throughout 
the Mexican territory. The average impunity index in Mexico is approximately 98 
percent.85 This high rate of unpunished crimes in Mexico is due to a number of problems 
in the judicial system. Most significantly, public distrust in the judiciary has resulted in 
most crimes going unreported. A recent ICESI victimization survey noted that 78 percent 
of crimes are not reported in Mexico, meaning that less than 22 out of every 100 crimes 
even come before a justice official.86 Out of the small number of crimes that are reported, 
judicial authorities investigate only one out of every five claims against a crime.87 
Furthermore, an even smaller number of these cases that are investigated actually proceed 
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to trial and result in a sentence. According to the Mexican government, approximately 
two out of every ten perpetrators prosecuted for a crime receive a prison term from 
judicial authorities.88 Overall, these deficiencies in the justice system mean that only one 
or two out of every 100 crimes in Mexico are sentenced. Due to these astoundingly high 
rates of impunity, the Mexican judiciary is obviously not fulfilling its role in enforcing 
the rule of law.  
 Nevertheless, in response to these significant flaws in the justice system, there 
have been a number of reforms implemented over the last decade to strengthen and 
develop the judicial sector in order to consolidate the process of democratization within 
the country. In 2008, President Calderón passed the most substantial Mexican judicial 
reforms to date. The 2008 package of reforms initiated an overhaul of the Mexican 
judicial system to replace, among many other changes, the secretive, paper-based 
inquisitorial justice method with an adversarial oral trial model.89 The federal reforms 
also improved the rights of the accused through modifications in due process, legal 
defense and the presumption of guilt. Calderón’s reforms also modernized and 
strengthened the judiciary by altering investigation approaches and creating new criminal 
codes for organized crime.90 These changes, intended to improve the administration of 
justice in Mexico, affect all aspects of the judicial system and are supposed to be fully 
implemented throughout Mexico by 2016.91  
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 These judicial reforms are important because they have substantial positive 
implications for democratic governance in Mexico. Many scholars point out that the 
fragile and weak nature of the judicial system in Mexico is the country’s greatest obstacle 
to democracy.92 If the 2008 constitutional reforms succeed in developing and 
strengthening the judiciary, democratization in Mexico will be enhanced, rather than 
obstructed by this branch of government. There is also widespread agreement within 
academic scholarship that there need to be changes in the institutional structure, 
investigative strategies, and culture of the Mexican justice system in order to make the 
government more accountable to the Mexican citizenry and respectful of the fundamental 
rights of its citizens.93 The fact that the 2008 reforms initiate these changes within the 
justice system demonstrates that there is significant progress towards strengthening the 
judicial pillar of a democratic political system within Mexico. Additionally, according to 
Mexican democracy expert Denise Dresser, rule of law is the most important aspect of 
democratic consolidation in Mexico, and without it democracy cannot flourish.94 Since 
Calderón’s reforms increase the judiciary’s ability to adhere to and protect the rule of 
law, democratization of Mexico is also significantly enhanced by these alterations. 
Ultimately, the hope is that Mexican judicial reforms will increase the capacity, 
transparency, accountability, and effectiveness of the justice system. If the judiciary 
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succeeds in achieving these goals, the consolidation of democracy in Mexico will be 
greatly bolstered. 
 While there are substantive changes developing within the justice system, the 
increased presence of drug trafficking organizations and counter drug efforts has greatly 
impacted these advances. Indeed, the drug war significantly hinders the performance of 
the justice system in Mexico. Some would even go as far as to say that the threat to the 
judicial branch posed by drug trafficking organizations is the most conspicuous and 
detrimental consequence of the drug war in Mexico. This is because the judiciary’s 
ability to successfully punish and control the problem of drug trafficking crime will 
determine this system’s performance. However, there are substantial pressures placed on 
the judicial system by drug trafficking organizations. For example, judges and other 
members of the judiciary will be subject to physical intimidation, harassment, and 
corruption through bribes and other payback schemes from drug trafficking 
organizations. The increased volume of drug-related court cases increases the burden of 
work within the judiciary and slows down the administration of justice. The focus on 
drug-related crimes will detract from the judiciary’s ability to enact justice in other 
important areas of society. All of these factors, as well as many others, may weaken the 
judiciary at a critical moment for Mexico. If the judiciary is weak, it will be unable to 
decrease drug related criminality in Mexico, thus creating a vicious cycle of lawlessness 
that will undermine Mexico’s democratic governance. Indeed, illicit drug trafficking and 
organized crime flourish under the exact conditions that the justice system is trying to 
fight against: an atmosphere of impunity and the absence of rule of law. Therefore, the 
Mexican judiciary can only be strengthened if drug-related crime is reduced. Otherwise, 
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escalating criminality related to drug trafficking will continue to weaken the 
administration of justice in Mexico’s political system. In the face of these formidable 
challenges from the drug war, it is crucial to assess whether the judicial system and its 
democratic reforms can be upheld. In light of the significant obstacles from drug 
trafficking organizations and counter-drug efforts, can rule of law be successfully 
enforced and developed by the criminal justice system so that the consolidation of 
Mexican democracy can be upheld? Specifically, can the judicial system fulfill its 
reforms in tandem with the presence of the drug war?  
 It appears that the drug war may undermine the judicial system’s ability to 
develop and strengthen. This is because both drug trafficking organizations and current 
efforts to combat drug trafficking predominantly counteract the positive reforms 
occurring within the criminal justice system. The following pages will examine the 
specific manner in which drug policy and drug trafficking organizations impact the 
judicial system. This analysis will begin by evaluating the impact on the judicial system 
from drug trafficking organizations, specifically focusing on increased corruption, 
criminality, and protections for the accused. I will then examine the effects of efforts to 
combat drug trafficking on the judicial system. Specifically, this section will focus on the 
organized crime clause, the distribution of resources and training, and extradition as 
important aspects of counter drug efforts within the judicial branch.  
 
Drug Trafficking Organizations: How they affect the Mexican Judicial System 
 Drug trafficking organizations are a serious concern for the judicial system in 
Mexico. Indeed, the fact that judicial reforms coincide with the recent upswing in drug 
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trafficking power and violence indicates that these illicit actors will influence the 
administration of justice in a number of formidable ways.  Although judicial 
reorganization will ultimately improve the strength of the criminal justice system, in the 
short-term this system will be greatly weakened by the numerous and significant changes 
that are currently taking place. Before the democratic transition in 2000 and the 
subsequent justice reforms in Mexico, the judicial branch was just an extension of the 
PRI administration. Thus, for most of Mexico’s modern history this branch used 
institutionalized corruption in order to perform its duties, just like most other state 
institutions under PRI leadership.95 With the transition to democracy, however, the PRI’s 
channels of accommodation and co-optation were no longer feasible for the judiciary. 
This is because the justice reforms implemented by Fox and Calderón eliminated these 
co-opting networks, and instead initiated changes that would eventually create a fair, 
efficient, and reliable judicial branch. At the moment, however, the Mexican judiciary is 
left in a precarious limbo. While the old channels for criminal justice have been 
discarded, the new organizational structures of the judicial system still have not been 
realized in most parts of Mexico. Thus, the Mexican judicial system has largely become a 
weak and vulnerable institution under the new democratic political authority. Some 
scholars even contend that democratic reforms have the perverse effect of weakening the 
judiciary because they are simply “window dressings” that corrupt judicial structures 
rather than reforming old procedures.96 Regardless of one’s faith in these reforms, one 
thing is clear: as the judiciary is undergoing transformation, this system has become 
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increasingly vulnerable. For drug trafficking and organized crime, the current 
vulnerability of the justice system means that these illicit organizations can more easily 
influence and disrupt the judicial system. Since drug trafficking organizations benefit 
from an environment without rule of law, it is likely that drug trafficking organizations 
will take advantage of this opportunity and strive to subvert the justice system in Mexico. 
 Recent developments in Mexico since 2000 have demonstrated that drug 
trafficking organizations have strived to do exactly that. Corruption of justice officials is 
the most obvious example of drug trafficking organizations’ ability to undermine the 
justice system in Mexico. Even though corruption has always existed in Mexico, over the 
last ten years drug trafficking organizations have attained unprecedented power to corrupt 
and control government authorities. For the justice system, Mexican federal and local 
police officials are the most corrupted aspect of the criminal justice structure. 
Approximately 319,000 local police officers are believed to be protectors, informants, 
and executioners for drug trafficking organizations in Mexico.97 However, since drug 
trafficking organizations currently have extensive infiltration and control over the 
Mexican police forces, there is little incentive for these organized crime organizations to 
target and contaminate the later stages in the justice system. Because a significant number 
of police are on the payrolls of major drug cartels, graft at this stage in the justice system 
means that many drug-related crimes will go unreported or uninvestigated, preventing 
them from ever entering the judicial system.  
 Nevertheless, there is still significant corruption present in Mexico’s judiciary. 
According to a former administrator of the DEA, drug trafficking organizations have 
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increasingly controlled judicial and penal officials over the last 20 years.98  This is due, in 
large part, to the numerous channels and pathways for corruption within the judicial 
branch. There are many steps involved in the judicial system in Mexico. The criminal 
justice system is an interactive chain that includes police, attorneys, law clerks, judges, 
and prison authorities. Given the abundance of steps in this system, there are a variety of 
stages that drug trafficking organizations can disrupt with corruption or intimidation. 
Recent judicial reforms are significant because they increase the number of these 
opportunities for organized crime to influence the judicial process. This is because 
changes, such as greater dependence on evidence, greater involvement of judges, the 
creation of new justice positions, increased participation of defense attorneys, and 
expanded procedural measures in Mexico’s 2008 reforms create greater bureaucracy and 
regulation in the judicial system. While these changes can have important benefits, 
overregulation of the judicial system is problematic because it increases the opportunities 
for drug trafficking organizations to engage in corruption.99 Thus, judicial reforms may 
actually ease drug trafficker’s ability to infiltrate and undermine the Mexican judiciary. 
  Corruption of the judicial sector has been widely observed in Mexico. It is 
important to note, however, that it is difficult to adequately measure the levels of drug 
related corruption in the criminal justice system because the innate secrecy of corruption 
and the widespread complicity of Mexican public officials in corruption. Nevertheless, in 
2002 the UN special rapporteur claimed in their report that 50 to 70% of federal judges in 
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Mexico were corrupt.100 In addition to this, there have been several DTO-related 
assassinations of judges in recent years.101 These events only serve to illustrate drug 
trafficking organization’s ability to corrupt or eliminate members of the judicial sector. 
Similarly, an astounding 36 percent of Mexicans stated that if a criminal is wealthy, they 
will be declared innocent in the judicial system.102 Given the large profits that drug 
trafficking organizations have at their disposal and their immeasurable capacity to 
intimidate public officials, it is no surprise that they have infiltrated the judicial system. 
In particular, when drug trafficking organizations do infiltrate the justice sector, their two 
main targets are usually the prosecutors who select cases to bring to court and court 
administrators who are in charge of paperwork.103 Prosecuting attorneys are critical for 
the judiciary because they determine what cases are seen by a judge and are brought to 
trial. Since prosecutors are essentially the gatekeepers for the judiciary, many drug 
trafficking organizations target these officials so that their cases never progress through 
the judicial structure. Similarly, influencing low-level court administrators is often the 
easiest and most efficient manner of making a drug-related crime disappear. While 
corruption has particularly targeted these divisions of the criminal justice structure, drug 
trafficking mordidas and intimidation have emerged among all levels of the judicial 
system.  
                                                 
100
 United Nations. Civil and Political Rights, Including Questions of: Independence of the Judiciary, 
Administration of Justice, Impunity. Report of the special rapporteur on the independence of judges and 
lawyers. Dato’Param Cumaraswamy. Commission on Human Rights Resolution, 2002, 18. 
101
 Sara Shatz, Hugo Concha and Ana Laura Magaloni Kerpel, “The Mexican Judicial System: Continuity 
and Change in a Period of Democratic Consolidation,” in Reforming the Administration of Justice in 
Mexico, Wayne A. Cornelius and David A. Shirk, eds. (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Norte Dame 
Press, 2007), 213. 
102
 Parametría, “¿Presunta justicia?” Mexico, Feb. 16, 2011 <http://www.parametria.com.mx/>. (accessed 
Jan. 3, 2011). 
103
 Bailey, “Drug-Traffickers as Political Actors in Mexico’s Nascent Democracy,” 24.  
  
52 
 
 Drug trafficking organizations’ ability to corrupt the judicial system is of 
significant concern. As a result of drug trafficking corruption in Mexico’s legal system, 
the impartial administration of justice has been greatly compromised. Corruption of this 
sector ensures that legitimate sentences are not handed out, and instead impunity is 
granted to drug traffickers allowing them to act as they please. This consequence makes 
the judicial system inert and ineffectual because it fails to impart the rule of law in the 
Mexican territory. Thus, corruption clearly weakens the judicial system in Mexico. Not 
only that, corruption also directly weakens democratic practices in Mexico because graft 
makes the judicial system accountable to organized crime groups, not Mexican citizens. 
By creating a system that does not defend the safety of its citizenry or hold guilty 
criminals accountable, the judicial system fails to adequately administer justice in Mexico 
according to democratic norms. Corruption is also extremely concerning because the 
judicial system has limited transparency, low oversight, minimal accountability, and very 
little civilian participation. As a result, corruption within the judicial system is especially 
potent and it can flourish without significant restrictions. Therefore, drug trafficking 
organizations can more easily control and harm the performance of this government 
branch than most other state institutions. 
 Drug trafficking corruption is also relevant to the judicial branch because this 
sector of Mexico’s government is responsible for holding corrupt government officials 
accountable and punishing them. Drug-related corruption of any government institution, 
even those not related to the justice system, undermines the rule of law in Mexico. This is 
because corruption creates unlawful arrangements that give criminal actors impunity. If 
the judiciary cannot effectively hold these corrupt officials accountable for colluding with 
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drug traffickers, the judicial institution is incompetent and weak. Since a strong judiciary 
is an essential requirement for democracy, bribes and coercion from organized crime 
clearly impede Mexico’s democratization. There are also other negative consequences 
from the judiciary’s inability to address corruption in other areas of the Mexican state. 
Drug trafficking corruption directly undermines democratic governance because it 
reduces the political authority’s accountability to the Mexican people and it represents 
organized crime, not the Mexican citizenry, in policy making. Organized crime’s ability 
to illegally influence state officials also sabotages democratic values such as 
accountability, transparency, and equal participation.  
 Therefore, as Mexico consolidates its democracy, the judicial system needs to act 
as an enforcer against corruption from drug trafficking organizations. However, it 
appears that the justice system has been incapable of adequately fulfilling this role. Even 
though there are widespread accusations of corruption in important state positions, 
Governor Mario Villanueva of Quintana Roo was the last high-level government official 
to be convicted for criminal charges.104 In 2001 Villanueva was charged with aiding in 
the trafficking of more than 2,000 tons of cocaine and receiving $500,000 in bribes per 
shipment of cocaine that he permitted.105 This shows that the judicial system clearly 
needs to strengthen its oversight, control, and punishment for drug-related corruption. If 
the judicial sector fails to do so, corruption in the Mexican state will only continue to 
strengthen drug trafficking organizations at the expense of these institutions. Fortunately, 
it appears that Fox and Calderón’s judicial reforms will give the justice system the 
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capacity to perform these functions. The judiciary’s increased investigative capacities and 
accountability from recent reforms appears to be an important factor in bolstering the 
judicial system’s ability to control drug related corruption. In this respect, the judicial 
reforms enacted by Mexico’s democratic regime can clearly coexist with Mexico’s drug 
war. In fact, these reforms will actually help to combat the increasing power of drug 
trafficking organizations in Mexico. Nevertheless, it is important to note that if judicial 
reforms succeed in making the judiciary a serious threat to drug cartels, efforts to 
undermine this system will only increase. Predominantly, efforts to corrupt the justice 
system have been concentrated towards the police because the judiciary was too weak to 
pose a serious threat to organized crime groups. However, as judicial reforms progress 
and strengthen the judiciary, we may actually see greater efforts to undermine the judicial 
system from drug trafficking organizations. This shows how, in many respects, judicial 
reforms and drug trafficking organizations are at odds. The judiciary and drug trafficking 
organizations are clearly struggling to maintain their strength at a critical moment in their 
development. It remains unclear which influence will prevail in this conflict, but one 
thing is clear: drug trafficking organizations will not aid the progress of judicial reforms. 
As the previous sections demonstrate, drug related corruption only serves to weaken the 
judicial sector and create greater challenges for the judiciary to overcome. While there is 
still hope that judicial reforms can overcome these obstacles, the justice system has 
demonstrated that it currently does not have the capacity to adequately enforce the rule of 
law in Mexico in the face of these impediments from drug trafficking organizations.  
 Corruption is not the only challenge that drug trafficking organizations pose to the 
judicial system in Mexico. Drug trafficking organizations also strain the justice system 
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because they increase levels of overall crime in the country. Drug trafficking 
organizations are not limited to only illicit drug smuggling, they also engage in other 
types of crime. In Mexico specifically, drug trafficking organizations have expanded into 
other criminal activities such as kidnapping, human trafficking, auto theft, extortion, 
counterfeit products, and arms trafficking.106 These activities clearly contribute to 
heightened criminality in the Mexican territory. Indeed, one only has to read the 
headlines from Mexico to notice the accelerating rates of crime affecting the country over 
recent years. Increasing criminality is problematic for the judicial system because it puts 
a greater burden on an already weak institution. Experts have noted that since crime and 
violence mushroomed in recent years, Mexico’s justice system has been overwhelmed by 
an overload of cases.107 This increased pressure on the judiciary is problematic because 
the justice system is already incapable of adequately and satisfactorily fulfilling its duties. 
According to a recent poll in Mexico, 79 percent of interviewees contend that justice in 
Mexico is not timely, complete, and impartial, with only 14 percent of Mexican’s 
believing that justice is administered fairly and efficiently.108 This clearly shows that the 
Mexican justice system is exhibiting some serious dysfunctions in its ability to enforce 
the law. High rates of impunity (at more than 98%) also support the conclusion that there 
are serious deficiencies in the Mexican judiciary’s administration of justice.  
                                                 
106
 Garzón provides an extensive description of drug trafficking organizations’ criminal activity in Mexico, 
explaining particularly well the activities these groups are involved in beyond drug production and 
smuggling. See: Juan Carlos Garzón, Mafia & Co.: The Criminal Networks in Mexico, Brazil, and 
Colombia (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2008). David Shirk 
also cites these expanded operations: David A. Shirk, Drug Violence in Mexico: Data Analysis from 
2001-2009 (San Diego: Trans-Border Institute, 2010), 13. 
107
 Bailey and Godson, 14. 
108
 Parametría, “¿Presunta justicia?” Mexico, Feb. 16, 2011 <http://www.parametria.com.mx/> (accessed 
Jan. 3, 2011). 
  
56 
 
 Escalating crimes by drug trafficking organizations will only exacerbate these 
shortcomings by increasing the number of criminal cases that must be addressed by this 
weak system. Indeed, significant trial backlogs are one of the main reasons that the 
judiciary is incapable of effectively and efficiently administering justice in Mexico.109 In 
most cases, it can take months or years for a crime to be prosecuted. Approximately 
90,000 accused criminals (nearly 40 percent of the prison system) are currently waiting in 
prison for their final judicial verdict because of case backlogs and inefficiencies.110 
Severe case backlogs can even prevent some crimes from ever being sentenced. More 
crimes from drug trafficking organizations will only exacerbate trial backlogs as more 
cases are brought to the judicial system. Thus, the justice system will become even less 
efficient and productive as a result of these illicit actors. This will not only counteract 
judicial reform efforts to make the judiciary more effective and efficient, it will also be a 
significant obstacle that will continue to impede stronger rule of law in Mexico. 
 The development of greater rights for the accused is also problematic for the 
judicial system while drug trafficking organizations have a significant presence in 
Mexico. This may seem contradictory at first because rights of the accused usually imply 
that the judiciary is strong and democratic. The current reality for Mexico is more 
complex than this assumption. Greater access to rights for the accused in the judicial 
system has arisen out of judicial reform efforts to strengthen and democratize Mexico’s 
judicial sector. One of the Mexican judiciary’s greatest flaws is its high rate of guilty 
verdicts once a suspect is identified. In the cases where crime suspects are arrested, 85% 
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of these defendants are found guilty.111 High conviction rates are especially likely if the 
crime is petty or if the suspect is poor. Indeed, one investigator found that more than half 
of the criminals in prison in Mexico City were serving sentences for robberies valued at 
less than twenty dollars.112 Additionally, the pattern of using torture to obtain forced 
confessions from suspects also serves as a basis for high rates of guilty verdicts in 
Mexico.113 In order to correct these flaws in impartial administration of justice in Mexico, 
Calderón’s 2008 reforms create greater rights for the accused. Specifically, judicial 
reforms in 2008 created the presumption of innocence, due process, and adequate legal 
defense as important guarantees for suspected criminals.114 These protections for 
defendants are important because they allow the judiciary to reach fair, impartial, and 
legitimate convictions. Ultimately, the Mexican justice system is only effective and 
legitimate if it is able to fairly apply sentences in this manner.  
 At the same time, however, increased protections for suspects also create an 
opening for drug trafficking organizations. Rights for the accused make it much more 
difficult to convict and try criminals. For example, Mexico’s recent judicial reforms call 
for increased reliance on forensic evidence, limited pre-trial detention, improved legal 
defense, open trials, and the separation of power of judges in the system. Many of these 
changes, while important, allow members of drug trafficking organizations to emerge 
from the judicial structure unscathed. For example, greater emphasis on forensics and 
evidence is particularly difficult for the judicial system, especially when the Mexican 
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police force lacks the professionalism to effectively collect evidence and carry out these 
tasks. Thus, it may actually be easier for drug traffickers to avoid punishment for their 
crimes because sufficient forensic evidence is still rare. Similarly, greater regulation by 
separate judges at different stages of the judicial process also provide greater 
opportunities for neglect and give organized crime members more openings to corrupt the 
administration of justice.115 Thus, judicial sentences against drug traffickers may actually 
be more lax and ineffective with these reforms. Similarly, open, less secretive public 
trials for the accused also provide criminal suspects with greater access to the witnesses, 
prosecutors, and judges ruling against them. This gives the defendant and other members 
of organized crime greater ability to bribe, coerce, intimidate, and execute participants in 
the justice system that are working against the accused. Indeed, there are concerns that 
the reformed judicial system provides insufficient protections for witnesses testifying 
against members of drug trafficking organizations.116 Additionally, improved defense 
attorneys for the accused, while important, may actually increase the likelihood that high 
profile drug trafficking criminals are not sanctioned. This is because the new adversarial 
approach opens the door for skilled defense attorneys to subvert the judicial system 
through technicalities and other methods, thereby allowing guilty criminals to go 
unpunished. Therefore, recent judicial reforms can increase the chances that drug 
traffickers are rarely sanctioned. 
 Clearly, there are many ways that increased rights for the accused can facilitate 
insufficient administration of justice towards drug traffickers and organized crime 
groups. In Mexico, the justice system’s ability to hold drug trafficking-related criminals 
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accountable in light of recent judicial reforms has greatly influenced public opinion. The 
Mexican public has greatly criticized these judicial reforms because they believe that 
these changes favor criminals instead of victims. This perception is especially clear in a 
2011 public opinion survey, where 48 percent of Mexicans contended that current laws in 
Mexico benefit criminals.117  Due to the recent explosion of drug violence in Mexico, 
much of the Mexican public is against rights for the accused because they believe that 
this strategy excessively benefits criminals at the detriment of the rest of society.118 This 
public perspective only serves to weaken the judiciary in Mexico. Negative public 
perception of reforms can pressure the judiciary to water-down reforms or revert to old 
practices. Such a result would only serve to undermine democratic accountability in the 
justice system and weaken the judiciary altogether. Additionally, if the Mexican public 
believes that the judicial system benefits criminals, such as drug traffickers, over ordinary 
citizens they will be less likely to report a crime, become involved with a trial, or have 
any confidence in the justice system. Confidence in the judiciary is important because, 
ultimately, the public’s faith in the judicial system will determine the legitimacy of this 
institution and the broader democratic establishment in Mexico.  
 Therefore, the development of these justice reforms during a time characterized 
by drug trafficking crime and violence is clearly problematic. While these reforms are 
increasing the strength of the judicial system in many ways, they are also negatively 
affecting public perception of the judiciary’s ability to confront drug trafficking crime. 
Since high levels of crime and insecurity are one of the main concerns of the Mexican 
public over the last few years, the judiciary’s perceived incapacity to fulfill its 
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responsibilities could have enormous consequences. Thus, drug trafficking organizations’ 
ability to use rights of the accused to their advantage not only will allow perilous 
criminals to go unpunished, it will also greatly decrease confidence and public legitimacy 
towards the judiciary. These outcomes will significantly undermine the consolidation of 
democracy in Mexico because it severely weakens the Mexican judicial system.  
 
Efforts to Combat Drug Trafficking Organizations and their Effect on the Justice 
System 
  As demonstrated previously, the Mexican justice system is clearly threatened by 
drug trafficking organizations, however it is also an essential component for combating 
these crime organizations. In order to defeat drug trafficking organizations and organized 
crime, Juan Garzón has written that there is a need for mechanisms and institutions that 
can investigate, apprehend, and punish criminals.119 In Mexico, it is the justice system 
that plays a central role in fulfilling these requirements. Right now, however, the 
Mexican judiciary does not adequately investigate, prosecute, or punish such crimes. 
Widespread impunity for drug trafficking organizations in Mexico has provided ample 
ground for these criminal groups to flourish. Therefore, only when the justice system can 
adequately sanction drug trafficking crime, will the drug trafficking problem be reduced. 
Fortunately, recent reforms in the judiciary have enhanced this system’s ability to combat 
drug trafficking organizations. Many of the judicial changes initiated over the last decade, 
such as increased professionalism and investigative capacity, for example, have increased 
the capacity of the judiciary to address drug violence and crime. However, these changes 
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are not without their consequences. While transformation of the judiciary is essential for 
combating drug trafficking organizations, they have come at great cost. The strength of 
the judicial system, and ultimately the integrity of democracy, is undermined by many of 
the judicial system’s efforts to combat the drug trafficking problem. 
 While there are many different aspects of the judicial system’s approach towards 
drug trafficking organizations, this analysis will focus on the new organized crime clause, 
the role of resources and training, and extradition as critical components of the judiciary’s 
counter-drug efforts. The organized crime clause, formulated under Calderón in 2008, is 
the most noticeable judicial effort to address the problem of drug trafficking 
organizations. The organized crime clause is significant because there clearly is a great 
need for tougher measures against organized crime in the Mexican justice system. As 
drug trafficking crime and violence escalated over the past decade, the judicial system 
proved incapable of adequately prosecuting members of organized crime within the 
existing framework. The release of four drug trafficking suspects in Monterrey in late 
2008 is a good example of the judiciary’s inability to address this problem. Even though 
these suspects had drugs, firearms, Federal Investigations Agency (AFI) uniforms, money 
counters, and stolen cars in their possession when they were arrested, federal Judge Jesús 
Salvador Fausto Macareno had to release them.120 Once released, the men assassinated 
the police officer that captured them and the local judge who detained them.121 The 
organized crime clause was therefore created to enhance the judiciary’s capacity to 
sentence organized crime cases so that similar scenarios could be prevented. 
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 In 2008, the Mexican constitution was amended to include the organized crime 
clause, which applies special provisions to judicial cases involving drug trafficking and 
organized crime. Specifically, this amendment allows for the detainment of drug 
trafficking suspects under arraigo for up to 40 days without criminal charges.122 Under 
arraigo organized crime suspects can be questioned and interrogated, they can be placed 
in special detention sites or solitary confinement, can be held for an additional 40 days, 
and judicial proceedings can even be suspended.123 However, since the suspect is 
detained without pending criminal charges, under these circumstances the accused is not 
allowed legal defense or the ability to credit the time they served in detention towards a 
sentence. 
 These tools to combat crime syndicates are crucial for punishing drug-related 
crime and violence in Mexico. As a result of these tougher measures, it will be easier to 
build a strong case against drug traffickers and much more difficult for drug-trafficking 
criminals to manipulate and evade the justice system. Nevertheless, these benefits come 
at a great cost. The organized crime clause is problematic because it undermines both the 
advancement of the judiciary and the consolidation of democracy. This is because, by 
applying special provisions towards members of crime syndicates, the organized crime 
amendment creates an exceptional legal regime for certain individuals. A separate and 
distinct legal system for some individuals is hazardous because it does not represent or 
treat all citizens equally. Denying certain citizens rights undermines the principle of 
equality that democracy is based upon and it promotes undemocratic practices. As a 
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result, the organized crime clause weakens the process of democratic consolidation in 
Mexico.  
 The detention of organized crime suspects without charge is also troublesome 
because it has the potential to imprison innocent citizens. According to Guillermo Zepeda 
Lecuona, the greatest miscarriage of justice is when a coercive apparatus of a democratic 
state denies an innocent individual of their liberty.124 Thus, in order for a democratic 
political regime develop, individuals should be presumed innocent, instead of held 
without charges. Otherwise, the legitimacy of the democratic regime will be seriously 
questioned. Failure to provide habeas corpus rights and due process threatens the 
authority and performance of both the judiciary and the democratic political 
establishment. In addition to this, the organized crime amendment also affects Mexican 
democratization in other ways. By creating a secretive exceptional custody system, 
Mexico’s organized crime clause opens the door for torture and abuse. Using torture in 
order to extract forced confessions is likely because, as one scholar explains, authorities 
have the incentive to use abuse since a confession can be used to bring charges against 
the suspect and the isolated, secretive location of detainees is conducive for abuse.125 
However, torture by government authorities greatly undermines good governance, 
accountability to the Mexican people, and democratic practices. Therefore, the judiciary’s 
organized crime clause has the substantial ability to undermine Mexico’s democratic 
consolidation, even though it may aid in counter drug efforts. 
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 In addition to the organized crime amendment, the justice system has also been 
developing its capacity to combat drug trafficking organizations by adopting sweeping 
changes to Mexico’s ailing judicial structure. Indeed, most of the judicial reforms 
initiated by Calderón and Fox over the last decade have been focused on professionally, 
procedurally, and structurally developing this framework so that the legal system’s ability 
to combat drug trafficking organizations is inherently bolstered. While a stronger judicial 
system capable of addressing the DTO threat is ultimately the aim of these procedures, 
this result is not guaranteed. Recent judicial reforms require enormous tasks to be 
completed, including the development of new law school curriculums, revised judicial 
training, altered courtrooms, and an overhauled custody and evidence system. These far-
reaching changes will be difficult to achieve. This is especially true because the Mexican 
justice branch (both federally and locally) lacks sufficient staff, resources, and 
professional training.126 For a system that already lacks resources, it will be incredibly 
difficult to implement judicial changes that require substantial amounts of financing, 
training, and support. It is also important to note that judicial reforms are expected to be 
implemented throughout all sectors of the judicial system in all of Mexico by 2016. The 
Mexican judicial system, however, is fairly extensive. Indeed, the judicial structure in 
Mexico is three-tiered, with the Supreme Court, 29 circuits (with over 200 circuit courts), 
and approximately 250 district courts.127 With the abundant number of courts that must 
be reformed and the numerous tasks that need to be completed, there is a significant 
demand for increased resources for the judicial system. Counter-drug efforts, however, 
substantially limit and even reduce the resources available for these judicial 
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improvements. Military counter-narcotics missions and police efforts to combat drug 
trafficking organizations divert crucial resources from the judiciary. Additionally, the 
organized crime clause requires significant resources and training, which diverts funds 
from general reforms targeted at strengthening the judiciary as a whole. As a result, the 
concentration of resources towards counter-drug efforts, rather than widespread judicial 
reforms, may prevent important improvements in the judicial system from being 
achieved. In some cases, reforms that are only half achieved or partially implemented 
because of insufficient resources will only make judicial processes weaker. Thus, by 
diverting vital resources, counter-drug efforts can noticeably undermine the Mexican 
justice system. 
 Extradition is another important anti-drug policy that has a significant impact on 
the judicial system. Extradition is important because many high profile drug trafficking 
criminals and leaders are not effectively controlled or punished by the judicial system in 
Mexico. Indeed, many of these criminals have managed to completely continue their 
operations from jail, escape from prison, or successfully bribe and coerce members of the 
judicial system in order to avoid prosecution altogether. Since the Mexican justice system 
is ill equipped to effectively sentence members of organized crime, extradition has been a 
crucial strategy for containing and punishing drug trafficking criminals. A prime example 
of this is the case of Osiel Cárdenas Guillén. For years Guillén ran the Gulf Cartel from 
his cell in La Palma maximum-security prison.128 However, only after he was extradited 
at the beginning of Calderón’s term were his criminal activities halted and he was finally 
penalized for his crimes. Even though extradition is clearly an important facet in 
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combating drug trafficking criminals, traditionally the National Supreme Court of Justice 
(SCJN) denied the Mexican government the ability to extradite drug kingpins to the 
United States. This is because U.S. courts apply sentences that are longer than 60 years 
and they allow the death penalty, both of which are not allowed in Mexico.129 However, 
in 2005 the Supreme Court reversed its decision and allowed extradition for the first time. 
While extraditions were unprecedented for Mexico, there have been a significant number 
of organized crime defendants prosecuted in U.S. courts. In 2007, Calderón extradited 83 
drug kingpins, and 95 drug trafficking leaders were extradited in 2008.130 However, these 
extraditions have also incited noticeable criticism. Some people contend that extradition 
violates the national sovereignty of Mexico’s judicial system and it simply makes the 
judiciary an extension of the imperialist will of the United States.131 This perception of 
the judicial system is hazardous because it could negatively affect the public’s view of 
the judicial system and the current political regime. Indeed, if the Mexican public 
believes that the judiciary or the government is promoting the interests of a foreign power 
rather than the will of Mexican society, they will be less likely to support this system. 
Thus, extradition has the potential to undermine the legitimacy of both the judiciary and 
democracy. Nevertheless, it appears that the Mexican public predominantly views 
extradition positively, rather than negatively. For the time being this means that 
extradition does not greatly undermine the justice system or democratic governance. 
Rather, extradition may actually generate greater legitimacy for the current political 
regime. 
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Implications for Democratic Consolidation 
 It is clear that the drug war affects the Mexican judicial system in a number of 
ways. Both drug trafficking organizations and efforts to combat these criminal actors 
noticeably influence the performance and integrity of Mexico’s judiciary. The previous 
sections revealed, however, that the effects of the drug war have a greater potential to 
harm, rather than strengthen, the judiciary in Mexico.  Drug trafficking organizations 
counteract improvements to the judiciary, undermine democratic practices, and 
destabilize the legal system in Mexico. These outcomes greatly weaken the judiciary’s 
ability to enforce the rule of law in Mexico. Ultimately, however, the rule of law will be 
essential for Mexican democracy. Democratic consolidation in Mexico will depend on 
the government’s ability to hold all societal actors – including drug trafficking 
organizations – accountable to the rule of law.132 If drug trafficking organizations and 
counter-drug policy prevent the rule of law from being applied, the process towards 
democracy will be greatly undermined, if not destroyed altogether. In the end, however, it 
remains to be seen whether the drug war will succeed in unraveling the administration of 
justice in Mexico. While drug trafficking crime, counter-drug efforts, and judicial 
reforms are clearly at odds, the judiciary is still making great strides in its reforms. 
Mexico’s 2008 reforms do provide hope that the judiciary will strengthen in spite of 
significant challenges from the drug war. Even though this is a possibility, it seems 
unlikely that the judiciary will emerge stronger in the next few years. This is because 
judicial reforms are trying to achieve too much, in too little time, and in the face of too 
many challenges. Therefore, it seems likely that drug trafficking organizations will 
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prevail over the justice system, leaving the rule of law behind. Ultimately, this will 
greatly undermine Mexico’s democratization because it will reduce the democratic 
establishment’s ability to govern. Thus, one thing is clear: Mexico’s democratization is 
undermined by the drug war. 
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PROSPECTS FOR THE PRESS IN A CONTEXT OF DRUG TRAFFICKING 
AND COUNTER-NARCOTICS MISSIONS 
 The press, just like the military and the judicial system, is a central pillar of 
democratic governance in modern political systems. Often referred to as democracy’s 
“fourth estate”, the media is a critical element for a participatory political system that is 
accountable to its citizenry. This is because the press facilitates two central components 
of democracy: representation of citizens and government accountability to the public. By 
providing communication between the government and its citizens, monitoring the 
behavior of the ruling regime, and providing information from a variety of perspectives, 
the media fosters a robust form of citizenship that is participatory, open, and responsible. 
Hence, for a nascent democracy attempting to consolidate mechanisms of representation, 
participation, and accountability, the Mexican press’s ability to provide information to 
Mexico’s citizens is of utmost importance. There is direct evidence that the press plays a 
fundamental role in facilitating the growth of democracy in Mexico. For example, 
Chappell Lawson found that at certain moments in Mexico’s political transition, the 
media promoted democratic change within the country by publishing stories that revealed 
PRI scandals and created an atmosphere of open discussion that was conducive to 
independent thought in civil society.133 Similarly, televised news also played a visible 
role in bolstering Mexico’s democratization in the early 2000’s by better informing 
citizen’s voting decisions.134 Given the great influence that the media has had over 
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democratic changes in Mexico, the press and the information it provides clearly play a 
fundamental role in the consolidation of Mexico’s fledging democracy. 
 However, even though the Mexican media has had the legally established right to 
freedom of expression for nearly a century, the Mexican press has only begun to truly 
exercise free expression recently and very gradually. This is because, under the PRI’s 
previous rule, the Mexican media was simply a mouthpiece for the PRI regime, not a 
news corps that freely communicated all information relevant to Mexico’s citizenry. 
While the provision or removal of state advertising funds was the primary method that 
the PRI regime used to control the press during its reign, the government also resorted to 
coercion and intimidation at times in order to restrict the information provided by the 
press to Mexican society. However, over the last two decades, the Mexican media has 
been undergoing a transformation. The press is now emerging as a more autonomous, 
assertive, and citizen-focused actor, rather than simply being a limited and marginalized 
producer of news. While biases still remain in major media outlets, journalism is now 
much more objective and reliable than under PRI leadership. Indeed, ever since the 
1990s, the Mexican media’s ability to involve and inform the Mexican people, as well as 
monitor the government, has been progressing gradually. 
 The development of a vibrant and robust press corps in Mexico over the last 
decade is significant because it demonstrates that Mexico is indeed transforming to a 
more consolidated democracy. However, drug trafficking organizations and counter-drug 
missions have seriously challenged these advances. As the drug war in Mexico has 
escalated, the strength and freedom of the press in Mexico has exhibited severe 
limitations. Because of drug trafficking organizations and government counter-drug 
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forces, the independence of the Mexican journalism is gradually being undermined and 
press freedom is largely becoming restricted. These changes in the Mexican media are 
concerning because the erosion of a strong and free press corps severely weakens 
democratic principles and undermines the country’s attempts at democratic consolidation. 
Given the gravity of these changes in the Mexican press, it is important to examine 
exactly how and why the media is being limited and marginalized in Mexico. 
 
Recent Limitations on Press Freedom 
 Violence from the drug war is the single greatest threat to media independence 
and freedom of expression in Mexico. Ever since drug trafficking organizations and 
efforts to combat these crime syndicates expanded significantly at the turn of the century, 
there has been a wave of violence directed against the media in Mexico. Recent drug 
violence against the media is so great that the murder rate of journalists in Mexico is 
among the highest in the world.135 The World Association of Newspapers reported in 
2008 that 23 journalists had been killed in Mexico since 2000, seven were missing since 
2005, and many others have been harassed or threatened with violence for practicing their 
profession.136 These levels of violence against members of the media are only increasing. 
According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, 2009 was one of the deadliest years 
for the Mexican press, with the execution of 11 journalists and one disappearance.137 In 
2010 these numbers only rose. This dramatic increase in violence against journalists is 
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both noticeable and significant. Mexico is now “one of the most dangerous countries for 
journalists in the world” according to the World Journalist’s Report on Press Freedom.138 
While most of this violence originates from the drug war, it is predominately drug 
trafficking organizations, rather than government counter-drug forces, that pose the 
greatest threat to Mexican media. A recent statistical analysis of crimes against 
journalists in Mexico found that 61 percent of the perpetrators of violence were identified 
as members of organized crime groups, while 22 percent of suspects were military or 
government officials presumably involved in counter-drug efforts.139 It is important to 
note, however, that while drug trafficking organizations are the main cause of serious 
crimes against journalists, such as murder and forced disappearance, members of 
government counter-drug forces (primarily corrupt police officials) perpetrate the 
majority of other non-fatal crimes against members of the press.140 
 As a result of these astounding levels of violence against members of the Mexican 
media, there have only been a sparse number of journalists who have covered drug 
trafficking issues for fear of reprisals. Indeed, self-censorship towards drug trafficking or 
law enforcement matters has become the norm among journalists in Mexico over recent 
years in order to protect themselves. This has been especially true in states with high 
levels of drug trafficking violence. The Mexican media’s current predicament was 
described particularly well by a U.S. State Department Human Rights Report, which 
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stated that “despite federal government support for freedom of the press, many journalists 
worked in a dangerous environment. Reporters covering corrupt public officials and 
various organized criminal organizations acknowledged practicing self-censorship, 
recognizing the danger investigative journalism posed to them and to their families.”141As 
a result, most drug trafficking issues currently go unreported in Mexico and journalists 
frequently publish crime pieces that are only based on official stories rather than the 
facts. Alfredo Quijano, the editor of Norte de Ciudad Juárez, explained the state of self-
censorship in Mexico well when he described his publication’s response to the murder of 
its reporters by drug trafficking organizations: “We have learned the lesson: To survive, 
we publish the minimum. We don’t investigate. Even at that, most of what we know stays 
in the reporter’s handbook.”142 These testimonies clearly show that the Mexican press is 
severely limiting its freedom of expression in response to the threat of the drug war.  
 This outcome is significant because it has important effects on the consolidation 
of Mexico’s democracy. Every time a reporter or news outlet engages in self-censorship 
because of the threat of violence from drug traffickers, the strength of the Mexican press 
is undermined and citizen’s access to information is limited. Only when the press freely 
distributes information about all events relevant to the Mexican people can there be open 
political discussion, awareness, and participation in Mexico. However, without a vibrant 
or free press, autocrats or powerful drug trafficking organizations have the power to 
shape the Mexican political reality without the input of the nation’s citizens, thereby 
undermining democracy. Therefore, the expansion of self-censorship in the press clearly 
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has negative consequences for the consolidation of a modern democratic state in Mexico. 
Indeed, one expert summarized this situation best when he stated: “As drug trafficking, 
violence, and lawlessness take hold, the Mexican media are forced into silence. This 
pervasive self-censorship is causing severe damage to Mexican democracy.”143 
 In addition to the worrisome situation of violence against reporters, widespread 
impunity for such crimes has only exacerbated the deterioration of press freedom in 
Mexico. Since the beginning of the war against drug trafficking organizations, not one of 
the murders or disappearances of Mexican journalists has been brought to justice.144 
Indeed, none of the serious crimes against reporters committed by either side of the drug 
war have been sentenced since 2000. In an emblematic example, Miguel Angel 
Villagómez Valle, a newspaper editor who regularly reported on organized crime, 
corruption, and drug trafficking, was abducted in late 2008 by members of a drug 
trafficking organization (presumably Los Zetas, who had left him a death threat the 
month before). His dead body was later found in a garbage dump with multiple gunshot 
wounds. However, the perpetrators of Valle’s murder were never found or prosecuted.145 
In a similar case, TV Azteca journalist Gamaliel López and cameraman Gerardo Paredes 
disappeared in May 2007. In the six months before they vanished, López and Paredes had 
been reporting on the presence of counter-drug military forces in Nuevo León and the 
corruption within their ranks.146 It widely assumed that these two members of the press 
corps were forcibly disappeared by the armed forces. Nevertheless, there have been no 
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suspects identified, tried, or sentenced for this crime. These two cases show that, on 
either side of the drug war, widespread impunity has prevailed for the majority of crimes 
against reporters in Mexico. 
 Impunity is problematic because it has succeeded in creating an atmosphere of 
fear in newsrooms that has reached alarming levels in many parts of Mexico. This culture 
has only succeeded in further reinforcing self-censorship and limited dissemination of 
information by the press. As a former Frontera reporter explained, “With the level of 
impunity on crimes against journalists and with the war on organized crime that the 
government is waging, reporters who cover violence and drug trafficking have, more that 
ever, the most to lose. There is fear. Fear to write about issues that we know will bring 
reprisal or death.” Thus, failure to administer justice for crimes against journalists only 
facilitates greater breakdown of the Mexican media. In order for the Mexican press to 
develop into a strong component of democratic governance, the current political regime 
needs to take steps to hold perpetrators of these crimes and provide protection for 
threatened reporters. 
 It seems, however, that the government is unwilling or unable to take the 
necessary measures to uphold the integrity of the press in Mexico. The current political 
establishment has lacked the political will to actively protect journalists from violence or 
intimidation from the drug war. Instead of adequately addressing the threat against 
reporters, the government has predominately ignored and even blamed the press for this 
problem. In fact, President Calderón has openly contended that by reporting on the drug 
war, the Mexican media has helped drug cartels by distributing their message and has 
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tarnished the image of Mexico in the international sphere.147 This negative view of the 
press is not uncommon in Mexico’s government. Many state officials have animosity 
towards the press because they believe that journalists have sensationalized drug 
trafficking crime and have overemphasized the government’s failures in combating drug 
trafficking organizations.148 Most concerning of all, however, the government often 
justifies its inability to protect journalists from drug crime by contending that murders of 
journalists who were killed in reprisal to their coverage of the drug situation were 
actually a result of business deals that went awry or unrelated personal conflicts.149 While 
these actions do not mean that the Mexican government is making no efforts to protect 
journalists in Mexico, they do demonstrate that commitment to freedom of the press is 
shallow among political authorities and it is democratic value that has not yet been fully 
ingrained in Mexico’s political system. By failing to adequately address or accept the 
problem and blaming the press for it, the Mexican government is contributing to the 
erosion of the media in Mexico. Only if the government makes a concerted and effective 
effort to defend journalists, will democratization be bolstered within the nation. 
Ironically, however, if the current pattern continues, the Mexican government will be 
complicit in undermining its own democratic political system. Therefore, the current 
political authority’s resistance to adequately addressing violence against the media is 
clearly a contributing factor to weakened democratic consolidation in Mexico. 
 In addition to violence against the Mexican press corps, corruption has also 
undermined the integrity of the media in Mexico. Corruption from drug trafficking 
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organizations has been particularly potent in the Mexican press because journalists often 
work in poor conditions and receive low wages. Monthly wages for journalists at major 
news outlets in Mexico City are usually between $700 and $1,500 U.S. dollars, while in 
the providences in Mexico wages usually vary between $300 and $500 U.S. dollars.150 
These low wages, especially in the provinces, are accompanied by poor working 
conditions. Many Mexican media outlets do not sign contracts with journalists so that 
they do not have to provide benefits or uphold labor rights. These meager conditions have 
made reporters increasingly vulnerable to corruption from drug trafficking organizations. 
Indeed, corruption of the press has been increasingly observed in newsrooms in Mexico. 
While a few instances of corruption have been documented151, the decision of plata o 
plomo makes it increasing difficult to ascertain the difference between cases where 
journalists have been coerced versus reporters who are on the payroll of drug trafficking 
organizations. Even though corruption is difficult to record, it has undoubtedly affected 
the Mexican press over the last few years. Corruption is hazardous because, like violence, 
it limits the integrity and freedom of the press in Mexico. Only when a free press 
provides Mexico’s citizens with the right to information will the consolidation of 
democracy be possible. As a result, through corruption of the press, drug trafficking has 
noticeably hindered progress towards a deepened democracy in Mexico. 
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Consequences for the Press and Democratic Consolidation 
 All of the factors explained above have pointed towards a similar conclusion. By 
limiting the Mexican media’s ability to freely express issues relevant to the Mexican 
public, the vitality and robustness that the press has been developing over the last few 
decades has been severely counteracted by the drug war. This conclusion about the press 
is significant because it demonstrates that Mexico’s current trajectory is pointed towards 
the unraveling of democracy rather than the consolidation of the political system. Only if 
there are drastic changes that divert Mexico’s current path will a rich, substantive 
democracy become a likely outcome for this country’s future. 
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IMPLICATIONS FOR MEXICO’S FLEDGING DEMOCRACY 
 The previous chapters demonstrate that the drug war undermines the 
consolidation of democracy in Mexico. It is clear that, in one way or another, drug 
trafficking organizations and counter-drug efforts significantly weaken the strength of 
civilian control over the military, the administration of justice, and press freedom. Since 
these three components are crucial for democracy, their erosion as a result of Mexico’s 
current drug situation signifies that the process of democratic consolidation will not be 
upheld in Mexico. Or, at a minimum, it indicates that while the government tries to 
control drug trafficking organizations, there will clearly be a period of restricted 
democratic progress in Mexico. Ultimately, what does this mean for the future of 
Mexico’s nascent democracy? Will democracy in Mexico survive these impediments 
from the drug war in Mexico? 
 While the consolidation of democracy has clearly been damaged by drug 
trafficking organizations and counter-drug efforts, this may not completely doom 
democracy in Mexico to failure. Even though the drug trade seriously threatens 
democratic progress, ultimately the fate of Mexico’s fledging democracy will rest on the 
Mexican public’s perception and belief in the democratic political authority’s ability to 
successfully meet the needs of its citizenry. Since the last decade has been Mexico’s first 
experience with democracy, the performance of the current democratic regime in 
addressing the issue of drug violence and crime will undoubtedly shape Mexican citizens’ 
faith in a democratic political system. Thus, if the current government fails to establish 
public security in the face of challenges from drug trafficking organizations, it will be 
unlikely that the Mexican public will view a democracy positively or support it over 
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another form of government. Especially with the upcoming presidential elections in 2012, 
the perceived success of the current government in combating the drug war will 
determine the political parties and political systems that citizens will support or elect. 
Interestingly, recent public opinion polls have not indicated that the Mexican public has 
confidence in the current democratic regime’s approach to the drug trafficking issue. 
According to a survey in March 2010, 59 percent of Mexicans believe that drug 
trafficking organizations, not the government, are winning the drug war.152 This negative 
view of the democratic government’s ability to combat drug trafficking reveals that the 
Mexican people do not have significant faith in the current democratic political regime. 
How this will play out in the 2012 elections remains to be seen, however it is clear that 
public support for the current political regime is not improving. 
 Therefore, overall it appears unlikely that a robust democracy will prevail in 
Mexico as a result of the drug war and its impact on all segments of Mexican society. 
This conclusion demonstrates that illegal drug activities and official counter-drug 
strategies can have significant consequences beyond the traditional problems associated 
with illegal drug activity alone. Indeed, it becomes apparent that even though drug 
trafficking organizations do not have outright political ambitions, their presence can 
nevertheless have a significant and pivotal influence on a political system. Only if there is 
a greater awareness of the threat that the drug war poses to a democratic system and the 
collateral damage it can have on the consolidation of democracy in Mexico, can there be 
real solutions to addressing these consequences. Acknowledging these challenges to 
democracy is an important first step towards the consolidation of democracy in Mexico. 
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Nevertheless, it remains uncertain whether the Mexican government has the strength, 
organization, and capability to take the remaining necessary steps against drug trafficking 
organizations in order to protect the consolidation of Mexican democracy. Therefore, one 
thing is clear: Mexico is at an important crossroads where the future of its nascent 
democracy is precarious. How the drug war develops in the next few years will determine 
the state of Mexican democracy for years to come. In this crucial moment for democracy 
in Mexico, ultimately time will only tell whether the democratic consolidation within the 
country will continue. 
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